ERISA: Jury Trial Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions by Flint, George Lee, Jr.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-1992
ERISA: Jury Trial Mandated for Benefit Claims
Actions
George Lee Flint Jr.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
George L. Flint Jr., ERISA: Jury Trial Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 361 (1992).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol25/iss2/1
ERISA: JURY TRIAL MANDATED FOR
BENEFIT CLAIMS ACTIONS
George Lee Flint, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
Through the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA),1 Congress intended to provide increased legal remedies for
participant-beneficiaries2 who are denied benefits from private employee
benefit programs. To achieve this goal, Congress provided new federal
remedies under federal causes of action that are tried in both federal and
state courts.
3
Following ERISA's passage, the federal courts, ever hostile to the
jury trial that legal remedies entail, have endeavored to thwart this goal.
Two facts have aided the federal courts' efforts: (1) ERISA lacks an ex-
press provision permitting jury trials in lawsuits by participant-benefi-
ciaries;4 and (2) employee benefit programs generally consist of two
components-trusts and contracts5-which have radically different im-
pacts when determining whether the right to a jury trial exists. Unfortu-
nately, employee benefit law has yet to develop a theoretical legal
independence from the body of law that relates to those two strands.
Consequently, federal courts can depict employee benefit programs as
trusts, a subject for the equity courts, and thereby deny a jury trial in an
ERISA action.6
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas; B.A.,
1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1968, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E., 1969, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D., 1975, University of Texas at Austin.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988)
(civil action may be brought against employers and fiduciaries who have violated Act). See
infra notes 233-41 and accompanying text for the congressional statement.
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
4. Id. § 502 (a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B); see Wardle v. Central States, S.E. &
S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 828 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112
(1981).
5. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(a)(l)-(4), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)-(4); see ififra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Note, The Right to Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions under Section
502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 737, 739 (1983); see also infra notes 130-66 and
accompanying text.
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In contrast, state courts early characterized employee benefit pro-
grams as contracts, a subject for the law courts, thereby granting a right
to jury trial in an ERISA action.' Juries typically respond more favora-
bly to participant-beneficiaries than to the predominantly corporate
sponsors of the employee benefit programs.'
Thus, whether a participant-beneficiary obtains a jury trial for re-
view of his or her benefit claim denial depends on the forum selected by
the participant-beneficiary and whether the plan administrator permits
him or her to remain in that forum.
This Article outlines the statutory scheme that permits the dual ju-
risdiction over ERISA lawsuits for benefits and explains the significance
of a jury trial to the participant-beneficiary's lawsuit.9 This Article then
discusses the principles used to determine whether the right to a jury trial
exists and reviews the approaches of the appellate courts, emphasizing
the failure of the federal circuit courts to properly resolve the jury trial
issue.10 Next, this Article provides the analysis that courts should use to
determine whether a participant-beneficiary has a right to a jury trial.II
This Article asserts that both ERISA and relevant constitutional
provisions require a jury trial in lawsuits by participant-beneficiaries re-
lating to their employee benefits. 2 This eliminates a motive for forum
shopping and fosters the congressional goal of providing increased legal
remedies for participant-beneficiaries.
II. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
A. Employee Benefit Programs in General
ERISA generally applies to two types of employee benefit programs:
welfare plans and pension plans. 3 These employee benefit programs
generally involve four parties: (1) the employer, who makes contribu-
tions to the plan and appoints both the plan administrator and the
7. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 13-112 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 113-93 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 194-311 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 315-21 and accompanying text.
13. Welfare plans provide benefits in the nature of medical, disability, death, severance,
vacation or education benefits. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 3(l)(A),
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1988). A pension plan provides retirement income or deferred in-
come. Id. § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). There are two types of pension plans: (1) the "defined
contribution plan" or "individual account plan" for which the plan document specifies the
annual contribution, id. § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34); and (2) the "defined benefit plan," id.
§ 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35), for which the plan document specifies the amount of the retire-
ment benefit.
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trustee;14 (2) the plan administrator, who administers the plan;' 5 (3) the
trustee, who invests the plan's funds; 16 and (4) the participant-benefici-
ary, who receives the benefits.' 7 A single party may serve in more than
one of these four roles." The employer, plan administrator and trustee
are all plan fiduciaries.' 9
There are usually four separate types of plan administrators: (1) an
employer;2' (2) a management employee, a committee of such persons, or
a committee dominated by such persons;21 (3) a service provider, such as
an insurance company operating under an administrative contract with
the plan;22 and (4) a committee with an equal number of representatives
from management and rank and file employees.23 Only the latter type of
plan administrator can be disinterested,24 or at least truly balanced.25
14. Id. § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5)(B); id. § 3(16),,29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A).
15. Id. § 3(16)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A).
16. Id. § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
17. Id. § 3(6)-(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6)-(8). See generally Robert A. Frei & James G.
Archer, Taxation & Regulation of Pension Plans Under the IR. C., 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 691, 692-
93 (discussing four parties in context of their role in pension plans and relevant tax
consequences).
18. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
19. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 3(21), 403, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1002(21)(A), 1103(a) (1988); see, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 323
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5103 ("[F]iduciaries include officers and direc-
tors of a plan, members of a plan's investment committee and persons who select these
individuals.").
20. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 3(16)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(16)(A)(ii) (employer plan administrator if none named).
21. See, e.g., Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 812-13 (6th Cir. 1987) (committee of executive
employees); Chilton v. Savannah Foods & Indus., 814 F.2d 620, 622 (11th Cir. 1987) (director
of personnel); Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d
521, 535 (7th Cir. 1986) (committee of management employees), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1094
(1987); Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1985) (director of
personnel).
22. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 441-42
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (stating insurer with authority to deny or grant claims is fiduciary under
ERISA); Schulist v. Blue Cross, 553 F. Supp. 248, 252 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (same), aff'd, 717 F.2d
1127 (7th Cir. 1983); Eaton v. D'Amato, 581 F. Supp. 743, 745-46 (D.D.C. 1980) (stating
service provider acting as claims administrator could be fiduciary if it had ultimate responsibil-
ity for claims determinations).
23. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 302(c)(5)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 186(c)(5)(B) (1988) (specifying membership of trustee for jointly administered union plan).
24. Plan administrators that have an interest in the outcome of their decision must satisfy
a higher decisional standard than those not so interested. See infra notes 71-79 and accompa-
nying text. The federal courts have long applied the disinterested decisional standard to the
jointly administered union plan. See, e.g., Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(treating this type of administrator as disinterested).
25. See George L. Flint, Jr., ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule Under Siege, 39
CATH. L. R . 133, 174-75 (1990); see also Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 468
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (ERISA "contemplates fiduciaries with dual loyalties" and this arrangement
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Employee benefit programs divide into two types: single-employer
plans in which the firm sponsors a plan only for its employees, and multi-
ple-employer plans in which several firms together sponsor one plan for
all of their employees.2 6 Most multiple-employer plans are multi-em-
ployer plans maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
with a union, designed to benefit the labor union members of the in-
volved employers.27
Employee benefit programs that are not multi-employer plans ordi-
narily consist of two separate instruments, both of which govern the ben-
efit program. 28 The plan instrument which is in the form of a contract
defines the rights and duties of the employer, the plan administrator, and
the third-party beneficiaries of the contract, namely the participant-bene-
ficiaries. The plan is executed by the employer and initial plan adminis-
trators.29 A trust instrument, in the form of a trust document, defines
the rights and duties of the employer and trustee with respect to the as-
sets of the benefit program, and is executed by the employer and initial
trustee.3 0 Sometimes, both instruments appear in the same document ex-
ecuted by the employer, the initial plan administrators, and the initial
trustee.31 Multi-employer plans also usually have two instruments: (1)
the collective bargaining agreement (a contract); and (2) an instrument,
labeled a trust document, that establishes a board of trustees, 32 defines
the board's duties, and covers the affairs of both the trust and the plan.33
is "an unorthodox departure from the common law rule against dual loyalties"), aff'd as modi-
fied, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
26. JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 48
(1990).
27. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 3(37)(A), 29 U.S.c.
§ 1002(37)(A) (1988); EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EM-
PLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 55-59 (3d ed. 1987).
28. See, e.g., Molumby v. Shapleigh Hardware Co., 395 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Mo. Ct. App.
1965) (plan and trust in separate instruments); see also John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court
Flunks Trusts, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 207, 223 (Gerhard Casper et al. eds., 1991) (pointing out
that ERISA does not supplant either trust law or contract law relating to employee benefit
programs).
29. E.g., 5A JACOB J. RABKIN & MARK JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS WITH TAX
ANALYSIS (MB) 13-1001 to -0021 (1991) (defined benefit program's plan instrument, Form
13.01, without separate trust instrument).
30. E.g., id. at 13-1074 to -1083 (trust instrument for defined benefit program, Form
13.03(I)).
31. E.g., id. at 13-2045 to -2077 (profit-sharing plan and trust, so labeled, in one docu-
ment, Form 13.13).
32. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)
(1988).
33. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 27, at 55-59. The Board typ-
ically hires a salaried plan administrator and staff or an outside administration firm to handle
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B. Nongovernmental Civil Actions and Jurisdiction
Two federal statutes provide most of the regulation of employee
benefit programs: the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA)34 and ERISA.35
1. LMRA regulation
Government regulation of multi-employer plans and single-em-
ployer, union-negotiated plans began with LMRA. This Act primarily
regulates collective bargaining agreements. 36 LMRA has two provisions
of significance to employee benefit programs.
LMRA section 302(c)(5) mandates that employee benefit programs
conform to three requirements. First, union officials can only participate
in plan administration and fund management as members of a board of
trustees on which both labor and management are equally represented.37
As a result of this requirement, labor unions have developed two types of
employee benefit programs: (1) programs administered jointly by both
union and management pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement,
exempted from LMRA provisions proscribing payment to union officials;
and (2) programs resulting from the collective bargaining process admin-
istered unilaterally by employers and subject to the proscription.38 Con-
day-to-day matters. Id. So even multi-employer plans separate plan administration from asset
management.
34. Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988)).
35. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
36. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
37. Id. § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5).
In the employee benefit area, LMRA attempted to eliminate the extortion, bribery and
mismanagement plaguing union pension and welfare programs by controlling their establish-
ment and operation. Eliot A. Landau et al., Protecting a Potential Pensioner's Pension-An
Overview of Present and Proposed Law on Trustees' Fiduciary Obligations and Vesting, 40
BROOK. L. Rv. 521, 535-41 (1974). Congress also became concerned that union officials
might convert program resources to their own use and, through LMRA, made it illegal to set
up a program administered solely by a union. Id. at 535.
38. See Randy J. Schneider, Surviving ERISA Preemption: Pension Arbitration in the
1980's, 16 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 269, 275-78 (1980). Both types settled disputes
through arbitration prior to ERISA. Id. at 276.
Unilaterally administered plans are of two types. One type is the subject of a collective
bargaining agreement. But an employer can also establish an employee benefit plan outside of
the collective bargaining agreement for union employees when it is not the subject of the col-
lective bargaining agreement with the union. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, § 1014(a), 26 U.S.C. § 413(a) (1988) (special rules for collectively bargained plans); 26
C.F.R. § 1.413-1(a)(2) (1991). Since employee benefit plans are mandatory subjects of negotia-
tion, these plans result when the employer and union fail to agree on a collectively bargained
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sequently, the jointly administered multi-employer plans possess a
disinterested plan administrator.39
Second, LMRA section 302(c)(5) requires that programs be funded
by a trust." Third, this part of LMRA requires the trustees of multi-
employer plans to operate them for the sole and exclusive benefit of the
participant-beneficiaries. However, this requirement contains no en-
forcement mechanism. 1 Instead, courts have implied a number of non-
governmental, civil actions.4 2 Federal jurisdiction for these cases de-
pends on a sufficient structural violation of section 302(c)(5).43 Under
this provision employers, participant-beneficiaries and trustees have sued
to enforce fiduciary duties;' participant-beneficiaries have also used this
provision to sue for benefits due under multi-employer plans.45
plan. See, ag., Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157,
180-81 (1971).
39. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
40. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 302(c)(5)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(A)
(1988).
41. Id. (prohibiting employer payments to labor unions except for payments to employee
trust funds for sole and exclusive benefit of employees and beneficiaries).
42. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
43. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109-10 (1989). Examples of suffi-
cient structural violations are when the trust has an unevenly balanced joint administration,
the trust is not established solely to benefit employees, the trust does not have an annual audit
or the trust does not set forth a detailed basis for paying benefits. See Bowers v. Ulpiano
Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir. 1968); Landau et al., supra note 37, at 538-39.
44. See, eg., Nedd v. United Mine Workers, 556 F.2d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 1977) (pensioners
sued trustees to make plan whole for failure to get employer contributions), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1013 (1978); Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 165 (9th Cir.) (former union members
who had withdrawn from plan sought transfer of moneys contributed on their behalf), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); Haley v. Palatnik, 509 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (2d Cir. 1975) (new
trustees sued old trustees to invalidate self-dealing contract); Quad City Builders Ass'n v. Tri
City Bricklayers Union No. 7, 431 F.2d 999, 1001 (8th Cir. 1970) (builder's association sued
for violation of administrator balance); Blassie v. Kroger Co., 345 F.2d 58, 75 (8th Cir. 1965)
(employers challenged use of trust property to run pharmacy offering discounts to
nonbeneficiaries); Employing Plasterers' Ass'n v. Journeymen Plasterers' Protective & Benevo-
lent Soc'y Local No. 5, 279 F.2d 92, 97-99 (7th Cir. 1960) (employers sued trustees to enjoin
plan administrator's misuse of funds for political contributions); Insley v. Joyce, 330 F. Supp.
1228, 1232 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (employee challenged break-in-service provision in plan); Porter v.
Teamsters Health, Welfare & Life Ins., 321 F. Supp. 101, 104 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (union members
sued trustees for diversion of trust funds); Giordani v. Hoffman, 295 F. Supp. 463, 471-72
(E.D. Pa. 1969) (union members sued for improprieties in administration of trust fund); Bath
v. Pixler, 283 F. Supp. 632, 635-36 (D. Colo. 1968) (trustees sued to determine disposition of
health and welfare funds on termination of old trust to establish new trust); Raymond v. Hoff-
mann, 284 F. Supp. 596, 598-99 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (trustees of new local sued trustees of old
union plan for aliquot portion of reserves); accord Bowers, 393 F.2d at 426 (jurisdiction lack-
ing without allegation of violation of section for trustees who sued nonparties for diversion of
funds).
45. See, e.g., Johnson v. Botica, 537 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1976) (former employee sued
to challenge denial of disability pension); Lugo v. Employees Retirement Fund of the Illumina-
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LMRA section 301(a) provides specific causes of action to enforce
contracts under collective bargaining agreements.46 Courts consider em-
ployee benefit plans to be this type of contract. 7 Therefore, LMRA sec-
tion 301(a) applies to both multi-employer and single-employer, union-
negotiated employee plans. Under this interpretation trustees, as parties
to the contract, have sued employers for contributions," and participant-
beneficiaries, as third party-beneficiaries of the contract, have sued for
benefits due49 and to rectify breaches of various fiduciary duties." Both
state and federal courts have jurisdiction for lawsuits under sections 301
tion Prods. Indus., 529 F.2d 251, 254-56 (2d Cir.) (former employee sued for declaration and
injunctive relief for denial of disability pension), cert denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976); Pete v.
United Mine Workers Welfare & Retirement Fund, 517 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (D.C. Cir.) (for-
mer employee sued to review pension benefit denial), reh'g granted, 517 F.2d 1274 (1974);
Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237, 1244 (D.C. Cir.) (class action brought to review denial of
pension benefits), reh'g granted sub nor. Kiser v. Boyle, 517 F.2d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d 744, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (union member sued trustees to determine
eligibility for pension), cerL denied, 375 U.S. 964 (1964).
46. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988) ("Suits
for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization ... may be brought in
any district court" without meeting amount in controversy and diversity requirements.).
47. See infra notes 256-61 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Clark v. Kraftco Corp., 510 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1975) (trustees sued
employer for delinquent contributions); Lewis v. Seanor Coal Co., 382 F.2d 437, 439 (3d Cir.
1967) (same), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 947 (1968); Lewis v. Owens, 338 F.2d 740, 740 (6th Cir.
1964) (same); Calhoun v. Bernard, 333 F.2d 739, 740 (9th Cir. 1964) (same); Pennington v.
United Mine Workers, 325 F.2d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 1963) (same), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 949
(1965); Lewis v. Lowry, 322 F.2d 453, 454 (4th Cir. 1963) (same); Lewis v. Mears, 297 F.2d
101, 102 (3d Cir. 1961) (same), cert denied, 369 U.S. 873 (1962); Local No. 90 Stove Mount-
ers' Union v. Welbilt Corp., 178 F. Supp. 408, 409 (E.D. Mich. 1959) (union sued employer to
compel employer's payments to pension fund), aff'd, 283 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1960).
49. See, eg., Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1976) (widow sued trust-
ees for survivor's benefits); Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., 350 F.2d 258, 268 (6th Cir. 1965)
(former employee sued for denied pension benefit); Rhine v. Union Carbide Corp., 343 F.2d
12, 15 (6th Cir. 1965) (former employee sued for denied disability benefit); United Auto.
Workers v. Textron, Inc., 312 F.2d 688, 691 (6th Cir. 1963) (union action on behalf of employ-
ees to determine their rights in terminated plan); Hayes v. Morse, 347 F. Supp. 1081, 1087
(E.D. Mo. 1972) (former employee sued trustees for pension benefit), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1265 (8th
Cir. 1973); Brune v. Morse, 339 F. Supp. 159, 159 (E.D. Mo. 1972) (same), aff'd, 475 F.2d 858
(8th Cir. 1973); Knoll v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 325 F. Supp. 666, 668 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (action by
former employees to discontinue pension fund and distribute assets to beneficiaries upon clos-
ing of plant), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973); accord
Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 176-77 n.17
(1971) (dictum in unfair labor practice case); Beam v. International Org. of Masters, 511 F.2d
975, 978 (2d Cir. 1975) (spouse of deceased union member sought denied accidental death
benefits).
50. See, e.g., Nedd v. United Mine Workers, 556 F.2d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 1977) (pensioners
sued trustees for not exercising trustees' rights under employee benefit plan), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1013 (1978); Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 161-64 (9th Cir.) (former union members
who had withdrawn from plan sought transfer of moneys contributed on their behalf), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); United Steelworkers v. Butler, 439 F.2d 1110, 1111 (8th Cir.
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and 302.51
2. ERISA regulation
The more comprehensive regulation of these collectively bargained
plans and most of the remaining single-employer plans began with
ERISA.52 For these plans ERISA specifies reporting and disclosure
1971) (union sued on behalf of employees for wrongfully paid insurance premiums under
health plan).
51. The LMRA provision for lawsuits on union contracts states only that these suits "may
be brought" in federal court, Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1988), so a litigant may also bring the lawsuit in state court, Charles Dowd Box Co.
v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507 (1962).
Litigants have brought suits in state court to enforce contribution requirements to collec-
tive bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Reeves v. Arizona Aggregate Ass'n Health & Welfare
Fund, 435 P.2d 829, 830 (Ariz. 1967) (trustees sued to recover contributions); Barbers Local
552, Journeymen Barbers Int'l Union v. Sealey, 118 N.W.2d 837, 838 (Mich. 1962) (union
sued for specific performance compelling contributions); List Indus. Corp. v. Gelber, 175
N.Y.S.2d 800, 801 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (trustees sued to recover contribution); Northwest Adm'rs.,
Inc. v. Wildish Sand & Gravel Co., 552 P.2d 547, 548 (Or. 1976) (trustees sued to enforce
payments by employer); Trust Fund Serv. v. Heyman, 550 P.2d 547, 548 (Wash. Ct. App.
1976) (trustee suit to compel contributions to pension plan), aff'd, 565 P.2d 805, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 987 (1977). Participant-beneficiaries have also sued in state court for benefits due.
See, eg., Atlantic Steel Co. v. Kitchens, 187 S.E.2d 824, 825 (Ga. 1972) (former employee
sued for retirement benefits); Hoffman v. Cross, 183 N.Y.S.2d 652, 653 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (former
employees sued for retirement benefits); Forrish v. Kennedy, 105 A.2d 67, 70 (Pa. 1954) (for-
mer employee sued trustees for retirement pension); Garrity v. United Mine Workers Welfare
& Retirement Fund of 1950, 43 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 7216 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas 1960) (retired
union members sued trustees for pension benefits), aff'd, 170 A.2d 117 (1961).
The LMRA provision for employee plans states that federal courts "shall have jurisdic-
tion... to restrain violations of this section." Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
§ 302(e), 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) (1988). Congress drafted this provision, however, to avoid the
anti-injunction requirements of the Norris-Laguardia Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70
(1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988)). See 93 CONG. REC. 54678
(1947) (statement of Sen. Ball). As a result, courts have claimed that state jurisdiction also
exists for restraining violations. See, eg., Nixon v. O'Callaghan, 392 F. Supp. 1081, 1085
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (removal of case for benefits due when statute required state jurisdiction for
removal; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1988) (state jurisdiction no longer required)); Butchers'
Union Local 229 v. Cudahy Packing Co., 66 Cal. 2d 925, 932, 428 P.2d 849, 852, 59 Cal. Rptr.
713, 716 (1967) (union sued to compel employer to arbitrate pension eligibility); Cox v. Supe-
rior Court of San Bernardino County, 52 Cal. 2d 855, 859, 346 P.2d 15, 19 (1959) (denied writ
of prohibition against employer's enforcement of breaches of fiduciary duties).
52. ERISA contains provisions favorable to participants in collectively bargained, multi-
employer plans. These provisions preserve participation and benefit rights for a highly mobile
workforce on a union- or industry-wide basis. Changing employment between employers in-
cluded in the plan does not interrupt accrual of benefits and vesting. Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, § 1014, 26 U.S.C. § 413(c)(3) (1988); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 2530.203-3 (1991) (distinguishing between multi-employer plans and other plans on this ba-
sis). The regulations apply the nondiscrimination tests for employee coverage as if a single
employer employed the employees of all employers subject to the same benefit computation
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requirements, 3 participation and vesting requirements, 4 funding re-
quirements55 and fiduciary standards. 6
ERISA differs from LMRA by specifically providing for express ac-
tions with jurisdictional limits. Section 502(a) of ERISA authorizes sev-
eral types of express, nongovernmental, civil lawsuits by plan fiduciaries
and participant-beneficiaries: (1) a participant-beneficiary suit for infor-
mation;57 (2) a participant-beneficiary or fiduciary suit (a) to enjoin viola-
tions of ERISA or the plan, (b) to obtain other equitable relief to redress
such violations, or (c) to enforce ERISA's or the plan's provisions; 58 and
(3) a participant-beneficiary lawsuit "to recover benefits due [the partici-
pant-beneficiary] under the terms of [the] plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan."59 Unlike LMRA, under the jurisdictional
provision of ERISA, all litigants must bring suit in federal court except
participant-beneficiaries suing for benefits, or the enforcement or clarifi-
cation of rights, all provided under the plan and not ERISA.6 The latter
litigants may sue either in federal or state court.61
formula under the plan. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 1014, 26
U.S.C. § 413(b)(1); 26 C.F.R. § 1.413-1(b) (1990).
53. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-
1031 (1988).
54. Id. §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061.
55. Id. §§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086.
56. Id. §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114.
57. Id. § 502(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(A)(c) (relief provided by § 1132(c) to par-
ticipant-beneficiary for failure to provide information required by ERISA upon request); see
also id. § 502(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(4) (appropriate relief to participant-beneficiary for
violation of § 1025(c) requiring annual statement to participant of vested benefit).
58. Id. § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (equitable relief for participant-beneficiary or
fiduciary for violations or to enforce statute and plan); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, supra note
19, at 323, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5107 (actions involving breach of fiduciary duty
and to enforce or clarify benefit rights provided under statute); see also Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988) (fiduciary liability to plan for
breach of fiduciary duty); id. § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(2) (appropriate relief for partici-
pant-beneficiary or fiduciary under § 1109).
59. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 19, at 323, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5107 (actions to enforce benefit rights under plan or to recover benefits under
plan not involving statute).
In any ERISA action the court may award reasonable attorney's fees. Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
60. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(e)(1), (a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(e)(1), (a)(1)(B).
61. Id. § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:361
C. Participant Preference for State Court
The jury issue under ERISA typically arises in the context of the
benefits-due lawsuit. Participant-beneficiaries desiring benefits from em-
ployee benefit programs normally apply to plan administrators or their
designees, 62 who rule on the application.63 Plans ordinarily provide plan
administrators with discretion in making these decisions.64 ERISA con-
templates this discretion 65 and pre-ERISA law all but mandated it.
66
Tax law once indirectly mandated discretion in benefit payment.67 State
law indirectly mandated discretion in plan interpretation.6
62. Any designee of a plan administrator is also a fiduciary. Id. § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(2) (1991); see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
63. ERISA provides that the plan administrator must have procedures for making a claim,
communicating any denial to the participant-beneficiary and appealing the decision. Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988); 29 C.F.R.
§ 2560.503-1 (1991).
64. See Langbein, supra note 28, at 220-23 (suggesting that after 1988 all properly drafted
plans will provide discretion because of the United States Supreme Court's review rule); see
also infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
65. ERISA defines a plan administrator as an entity with discretion in the administration
of the plan. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)
(1988). The significance of the discretion presently deals with the courts' review standard for
the decision, because of a misreading of the Supreme Court's directive by the circuit courts.
The misreading involves the courts' application of the arbitrary and capricious standard in all
cases involving discretion, rather than the abuse of discretion standard, of which the arbitrary
and capricious standard is one part and de novo review the other part. See infra notes 71-79
and accompanying text. One commentator, speaking for those draftsmen who risked legal
malpractice by ignoring pre-ERISA law and the proper drafting of ERISA plans, concluded
that the Supreme Court's directive will mandate the discretion. See Langbein, supra note 28,
at 220. ERISA plans based on forms from the pre-ERISA law generally have that discretion.
See, eg., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 787 (8th Cir. 1944) (action of board in all re-
spects to be final and conclusive, the typical pre-ERISA language granting discretion).
66. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
67. The estate tax code defined a taxable lump sum to include an amount payable as a
lump sum distribution at the election of the recipient. 26 U.S.C. § 2039(c) (1983) (relating to
exemption from estate taxes for payments from qualified retirement plans other than lump
sums), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1852(a)(1)(A), 100 Stat.
2085, 2868. Plan administrator discretion concerning payment method destroyed that taxable
election. The income tax code included in taxable income those amounts paid or made avail-
able by a retirement plan. 26 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1980), amended by Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 31 l(c)(1), 314(c)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 277 (to delete availability
language). Plan administrator discretion concerning payment times destroyed that taxable
availability.
68. Several early decisions by courts held that, absent fraud, courts could not review a plan
administrator's decision if the plan provided that the plan administrator had discretion to
determine eligibility and other matters under the plan and that such decision was conclusive.
See, eg., Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th
Cir. 1983) (under trust theory for LMRA plan); Clark v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 118
N.E. 348, 351 (Mass. 1918) (under contract theory for employee benefit plan); McNevin v.
Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98, 100 (App. Div. 1898) (under gratuity theory for employee
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If the plan administrator denies the application, the participant-ben-
eficiary must first appeal the decision to the plan administrator. 9 If the
plan administrator does not reverse the decision, the participant-benefici-
ary may sue for recovery of benefits in either federal or state court.70
1. Two approaches to the decision's review
Ordinarily, the issue for the courts in the benefits-due lawsuit is the
review of the plan administrator's discretionary decision. The United
States Supreme Court, in dicta, has mandated that courts conduct this
review under the abuse of discretion standard of trust law.7 This stan-
dard consists of essentially two parts: (1) the deferential (to the plan
administrator) arbitrary and capricious standard for the disinterested
plan administrator with proper motives;72 and (2) de novo review for
disinterested plan administrators with improper motives and for inter-
ested plan administrators.73
Which abuse of discretion review standard applies depends on the
type of plan administrator. The disinterested, properly-motivated plan
administrator fails the deferential arbitrary and capricious test when he
benefit plan), aff'd, 60 N.E. 1115 (N.Y. 1901). Without that discretionary provision, courts
applied the usual contract construction rule, which requires that courts construe the contract
against the employer-draftsman. Compare Menke, 140 F.2d at 791 (discretion so not con-
strued against draftsman) with Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 11 N.E.2d 878, 879 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1937) (no discretion so construed against draftsman). Writers of retirement plans
could avoid problems of poor draftsmanship by providing the plan administrator with the
discretion to interpret the plan and determine conclusively any controversy between the plan
and the participant-beneficiary.
69. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 503(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2)
(1988); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1991).
70. Id. § 502(a)(1)(B), (e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (e)(1). The participant-benefici-
ary must exhaust the plan's appeal procedure before bringing the benefit denial to a court. See,
ag., Springer v. Wal-Mart Assocs. Group Health Plan, 908 F.2d 897, 899 (11th Cir. 1990);
Merritt v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 1034, 1035 (11th Cir. 1989); Wolf v. National
Shopmen Pension Fund, 728 F.2d 182, 185 (3d Cir. 1984); Jenkins v. Local 705 Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1983); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559,
567-68 (9th Cir. 1980). But see Curry v. Contract Fabricators Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, 891
F.2d 842, 846-47 (1 lth Cir. 1990) (exception to exhaustion when resort to administrative pro-
cess is futile); Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 727 F.2d 177, 180-85 (8th Cir. 1984) (ex-
ception to exhaustion of remedies rule for retirees who are not owed duty of fair representation
by union), cerL denied, 471 U.S. 1102 (1985).
71. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (dealing with plan not
granting plan administrator discretion); see also Langbein, supra note 28 (suggesting Supreme
Court drew review principle from wrong body of law). This Article agrees. However, the
review principle is the same under either the trust law used by the Supreme Court or the
contract law used by Langbein and this Article. See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
72. See, eg., 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. e (1959).
73. See, eg., id. § 187 cmt. g; see also Flint, supra note 25, at 168-72 (explaining applica-
tion of this standard to plan administrators).
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or she fails to have one of several logical reasons and some evidence to
support his or her decision.74 The disinterested, improperly motivated
plan administrator is one who decides from an improper motive other
than self-dealing, such as hatred, and is also described as acting in "bad
faith."' 75 The interested plan administrator is one who decides from a
dishonest motive, such as self-dealing, and is described as acting in "bad
faith."' 76 These latter two types of plan administrators fail de novo re-
view when their decision disagrees with the judicial fact finder's
decision.77
Since only plan administrators of multi-employer plans are cur-
rently disinterested, the de novo review should apply to most plans.78
Most courts, however, continue to use the deferential arbitrary and capri-
cious standard in all benefits-due lawsuits involving a review of the plan
administrator's decision.79
The Supreme Court's standard of review is the same as that used
under contract law.80 As is the case with any area of developing law
dealing with a new instrument, courts have struggled with employee ben-
efits law in an effort to determine which previously existing bodies of law
should provide a basis of analogous rules. As the plan instruments are
essentially founded on two bodies of law-contract law and trust law-
each with a different nature, courts have eventually considered employee
benefit programs as either one or the other. As contracts rarely provide
for discretionary decisions,"1 courts which consider employee benefit pro-
74. Flint, supra note 25, at 140-43, 169-70.
75. Id. at 172 n.186.
76. Id. at 170-71.
77. See, eg., id. at 167-72. Post-Bruch cases have failed to follow this rule since they
interpret Bruch as denying de novo review in the presence of discretion. See, e.g., In re Gulf
Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. 1149, 1181 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
78. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
79. E.g., Davis v. Kentucky Fin. Cos. Retirement Plan, 887 F.2d 689, 694 (6th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1924 (1990); McConnell v. Texaco, 727 F. Supp. 751, 756 (D. Mass.
1990); Jader v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 1338, 1340-41 (D. Minn. 1989);
O'Dom v. GCIU Supplemental Retirement & Disability Funds, 722 F. Supp. 365, 370-71
(S.D. Ohio 1989).
The Court in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch held that in the absence of discretion,
ERISA mandated de novo review. 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). In dicta, the Supreme Court
indicated that if the plan provided discretion to the plan administrator the trust review stan-
dard of abuse of discretion applied. Id.
80. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
81. See, eg., 3A ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 644, at 78 (1964) (explain-
ing that such provisions must be clearly expressed or courts will not enforce them); see also
Clark v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 118 N.E. 348, 351 (Mass. 1918) (finding analogous
provision to pension plan's discretion provision only in buyer's satisfaction clauses in sales
contracts and architects' approval clauses in construction contracts).
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grams to be contractual in nature have analogized them to construction
contracts with a provision for an architect's certificate of progress,8 2 or to
sales contracts with a provision for buyer's satisfaction. 3 But whether
82. See infra note 84.
Construction contracts often contain a provision that an architect or engineer will conclu-
sively determine the sufficiency of the contractor's work. Under this provision the architect or
engineer supervises the work and issues a certificate of progress under which the owner pays
the contractor. Courts review the architect's or engineer's decision under a standard contain-
ing both tests of the abuse of discretion standard, namely, a test for a logical reason when
properly motivated (the arbitrary and capricious standard) and a test for improper motive
when improperly motivated (the de novo review standard). See, ag., Public Water Supply
Dist. No. 8. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 478 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Mo. 1972) (applying de novo
review), modified on other grounds, 513 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. 1974); Travis-Williamson County
Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Page, 358 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962)
(applying arbitrary and capricious standard), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 367
S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1963). The architect's or engineer's decision is final and binds the parties
unless in rendering a decision he or she acted fraudulently or made such a gross mistake as to
imply bad faith or a failure to exercise an honest judgment. Eg., Continental Casualty Co. v.
Wilson-Avery, Inc., 156 S.E.2d 152, 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967) (architect upheld); James I.
Barnes Constr. Co. v. Washington Township, 184 N.E.2d 763, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 1962) (engi-
neer overruled on conflicting evidence); Public Water Supply Dist No. 8, 478 S.W.2d at 296
(engineer upheld); Antrim Lumber Co. v. Bowline, 460 P.2d 914, 921, 923 (Okla. 1969) (engi-
neer overruled as evidence sustained jury finding of measurement error); Travis-Williamson,
358 S.W.2d at 162 (engineer overruled as evidence sustained jury finding of failure to issue
certificate for substantial completion when only needed clean-up and adjustment work); see
Ruckman & Hansen, Inc. v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 244 A.2d 277, 278 (Del. 1968)
(Director of Authority); O.K. Johnson Elec. v. Hess-Martin Corp., 464 P.2d 206, 210-11
(Kan. 1970) (in dicta, architect overruled as decision outside scope of clause); City of Balti-
more v. Allied Contractors, 204 A.2d 546, 552 (Md. 1964) (Director of Public Works); Henry
B. Byors & Sons v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 264 N.E.2d 657, 664 (Mass. 1970) (in dicta,
architect overruled as decision outside scope of clause); see also 1 RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 303(b)-(f) (1932) (listing instances in which condition precedent requiring archi-
tect's certificate will be excused).
Failure to exercise an honest judgment is equivalent to "arbitrary and capricious" action.
Eg., Tobin Quarries v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 64 F. Supp. 200, 207 (D.
Neb.) (court not to uphold architect or engineer for an arbitrary action), aff'd, 157 F.2d 482
(8th Cir. 1946); Clack v. State Dep't of Pub. Works, 275 Cal. App. 2d 743, 747, 80 Cal. Rptr.
274, 276-77 (1969) (engineer's arbitrary act without reason gross error, not bad faith); Edward
Edinger Co. v. Willis, 260 111. App. 106, 121 (1931) (arbitrary non-action by architect is fraud);
Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Bergen County Sewer Auth., 113 A.2d 787, 799 (N.J. 1955) (engi-
neer's arbitrary action without reason is fraud); Savin Bros. v. State, 405 N.Y.S.2d 516, 519
(App. Div. 1978) (no indication that engineer's acts were unreasonable so as to constitute bad
faith), aff'd, 393 N.E.2d 1041 (N.Y. 1979); Goodrum v. State, 158 S.W.2d 81, 86-87 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942) (court will not uphold architect or engineer for acting capriciously, arbitrarily or
fraudulently); accord Huey v. Davis, 556 S.W.2d 860, 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (upholding
architect approval in land covenant), rev'd on other grounds, 571 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1978); see
41 U.S.C. § 321 (1990) (government officer decision in government contract conclusive, unless
fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith or not
supported by substantial evidence).
83. See infra note 84.
Sales contracts sometimes have a condition that the goods will be satisfactory to the
buyer, thereby qualifying the buyer's obligation to purchase. A court reviews the buyer's dis-
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the court used the contractual approach or the trust approach, the review
standard for the discretionary decision was still the same. Thus, the
abuse of discretion review standard for employee benefit programs has a
dual origin: contract law8 4 and trust law.8 5 Even the plan document
cretionary decision under a standard containing both tests of the abuse of discretion standard.
Courts interpret this provision in such commercial contracts to require satisfaction in good
faith and after an exercise of an honest judgment. E.g., Meredith Corp. v. Design & Lithogra-
phy Ctr., 614 P.2d 414, 417 (Idaho 1980) (printed advertising); Frankfort Distilleries v. Burns
Bottling Mach. Works, 197 A. 599, 602 (Md. 1938) (bottle labeling machine); Alper Blouse
Co. v. E. E. Connor & Co., 127 N.E.2d 813, 815 (N.Y.), reh'g denied, 130 N.E.2d 598 (N.Y.
1955) (nylon cloth); Fulcher v. Nelson, 159 S.E.2d 519, 522 (N.C. 1968) (automobile); 2 RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 228 cmt. a (1981).
84. In the seminal state case concerning review of a plan administrator's discretionary
decision under the contract approach, Clark v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 118 N.E. 348
(Mass. 1918), the court analogized the plan, comprised solely of employer contributions and
administered by an employer-appointed plan administrator, to a construction contract with a
provision for an architect's or engineer's certificate, or a sales contract with a provision for
buyer's satisfaction. Id. at 349. Under these types of contractual provisions one party would
provide the building or goods to the satisfaction of the architect, engineer or buyer. Following
the precedent for these provisions, see supra notes 82-83, the court concluded that it would
overturn the plan administrator's discretionary decision only after finding evidence of "want of
good faith." Id. at 350. This is the second test of the abuse of discretion standard.
Many subsequent state courts adopted this contractual approach and viewed Clark as
controlling the situation, frequently adding the other test of the abuse of discretion standard.
See, eg., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Robertson, 225 S.W. 649, 652-53 (Ark. 1920) (no evi-
dence of bad faith); Bird v. Connecticut Power Co., 133 A.2d 894, 897 (Conn. 1957) (whim);
Schwartz v. Century Circuit, Inc., 163 A.2d 793, 796 (Del. Ch. 1960) (fraud, bad faith and the
like); Van Pelt v. Berefco, Inc., 208 N.E.2d 858, 863 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965) (fair and reasonable
but uses bad faith test); Norman v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 322 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Ky.
1959) (bad faith); Wilson v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 194 N.E. 441, 443 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934)
(whim or caprice); Moore v. Postal Tel-Cable Co., 24 S.E.2d 361, 363 (S.C. 1943) (fraud or
bad faith but court uses unreasonableness test); Long v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 442
S.W.2d 462, 466-67 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (fraud and bad faith); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Butler, 86 S.W.2d 258, 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (good faith); Dowling v. Texas & N.O.R.R.,
80 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (not subject to attack in court except upon showing
of fraud or bad faith). Some state courts followed Clark even when viewing the situation as a
gratuity. See Spiner v. Western Union Tel. Co., 73 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)
(not subject to attack in court absent actual fraud or bad faith). Other state courts have used
the lack of good faith rule without an indication of its source. See Paddock Pool Constr. Co.
v. Monseur, 533 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); Bos v. United States Rubber Co., 100
Cal. App. 2d 565, 570, 224 P.2d 386, 388 (1950). Therefore, under the contractual approach,
the review standard comprises both tests of the abuse of discretion standard.
85. Another approach adopted by the courts considers the employee benefit plan as a trust
and applies trust law. Trust law also mandates use of the abuse of discretion standard to
review a trustee's discretionary decision. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959).
This standard also applies when the trustee has discretionary authority to interpret the trust
instrument. E.g., Taylor v. McClave, 15 A.2d 213, 215 (N.J. Ch. 1940); GEORGE G. BOGERT
ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 559, at 169-71 (1980).
Most state courts use the contractual approach. See infra note 208 and accompanying
text. However, following the trust law precedent, a few state courts concluded that they would
overturn the plan administrator's discretionary decision only after finding evidence of want of
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interpretive standard was the same under either contract law86 or trust
law.87 The court thus should use the same review and interpretation
good faith or an absence of a reasonable judgment. E.g., Leigh v. Estate of Leigh, 284
N.Y.S.2d 991, 994-95 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (arbitrary or bad faith).
The primary use of the trust law approach is in LMRA cases for purposes of reviewing
plan administrator action only. LMRA specifically provides that the plans must be in trust
form. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 302(c)(5)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(A)
(1988). So the federal and state courts considering a LMRA case usually follow the review
standard of trust law. However, since they are generally dealing with disinterested plan ad-
ministrators, hopefully with proper motives, they describe the standard as the arbitrary and
capricious rule. Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Kennet v. United Mine-
workers, 183 F. Supp. 315, 318 (D.D.C. 1960) (rule of Hobbs); Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp.
346, 349 (D.D.C. 1958) (rule for noncharitable trust); Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282, 286-
87 (D.D.C. 1958) (rule for charitable trust); Barlow v. Roche, 161 A.2d 58, 63 (D.C. 1960)
(citing AuSTIN W. ScoTr, ScoTr ON TRUSTS § 187 (2d ed. 1956)); Forrish v. Kennedy, 105
A.2d 67, 70 (Pa. 1954) (good faith and within bounds of reasonable judgment). Courts dealing
with LMRA cases, however, regard the plan as a contract, not a trust. See infra notes 255-69
and accompanying text.
So under the trust approach, the review standard comprises both tests of the abuse of
discretion standard.
86. Fact finders ordinarily construe ambiguous contracts against the drafter. Moulor v.
American Life Ins. Co., 111 U.S. 335, 341-43 (1884) (insurance contract); Grace v. American
Century Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 282 (1883) (same); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hercules Powder
Co., 224 F.2d 293, 294 (3d Cir. 1955) (same). However, this rule does not apply when the plan
administrator has interpretative discretion. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. In-
stead, the fact finder must use the abuse of discretion standard. See supra note 84 and accom-
panying text.
87. To interpret trusts, courts generally use the construction rules applicable to written
instruments, namely contracts, deeds and wills. See, e.g., Murphy v. Morris, 141 S.W.2d 518,
520 (Ark. 1940); Storkan v. Ziska, 94 N.E.2d 185, 188 (Ill. 1950); In re Work Family Trust,
151 N.W.2d 490, 492 (Iowa 1967); In re Hauck's Estate, 223 P.2d 707, 710 (Kan. 1950); Hart
v. First Nat'l Bank, 112 So. 2d 565, 567 (Miss. 1959); In re Mann's Estate, 56 N.W.2d 621,
623 (Neb. 1953); Marks v. Southern Trust Co., 310 S.W.2d 435, 437-38 (Tenn. 1958); William
Buchanan Found. v. Shepperd, 283 S.W.2d 325, 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), rev'd on other
grounds, 289 S.W.2d 553 ('ex. 1956). In the event of ambiguity, courts ordinarily construe
the trust in favor of the beneficiary and against the settlor. See, eg., Brenneman v. Bennett,
420 F.2d 19, 24 (8th Cir. 1970) (Iowa law); Funsten v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 805, 808 (8th
Cir. 1945) (Missouri law); Seasongood v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 486, 491 (S.D. Ohio
1971) (Ohio law); Sale v. World Oil Co., 6 F. Supp. 321, 327 (N.D. Tex. 1933) (Texas law),
aff'd sub nom. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Campbell, 69 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 292
U.S. 648 (1934); In re Greenleaf's Estate, 101 Cal. App. 2d 658, 661-62, 225 P.2d 945, 948
(1951); Lyman v. Stevens, 197 A. 313, 316 (Conn. 1938); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Clarke,
178 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Mo. 1944); Osborn v. Bankers Trust Co., 5 N.Y.S.2d 211, 215 (Sup. Ct.
1938); Damiani v. Lobasco, 79 A.2d 268, 271 (Pa. 1951); McCollum v. Braddock Trust Co.,
198 A. 803, 805 (Pa. 1938); Wood v. Paul, 95 A. 720, 722 (Pa. 1915). But as with contract
interpretation, this rule does not apply when the trustee has interpretative discretion. See
supra notes 65-68. Instead, the fact finder must use the abuse of discretion standard. See
supra note 85 and accompanying text. To the extent the interpretation of the trust instrument
involves issues of fact, some courts have discretion to submit them to a jury. See Georgopolis
v. George, 54 N.W.2d 137, 141 (Minn. 1952).
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rules for benefits-due lawsuits regardless of whether courts and litigants
treat the issues as arising under contract theory or trust theory.
2. Two different jury trial results
There is, however, a major difference between these two interpreta-
tional approaches when it comes to the right to trial by jury. Courts that
consider benefits-due lawsuits contract-like, and therefore legal in na-
ture,8 submit them to a jury trial, 9 while courts that regard them as
88. Courts consider contract matters as legal in nature because in pre-1791 England, liti-
gants brought these actions under writs of assumpsit or debt, at law with trial by jury. JOHN
H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 285-87 (2d ed. 1979). Conse-
quently, an action for money damages from a breach of contract in federal court entitles one to
a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, see, eg., Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542 (1970) (New York law; even when action for money damages
coupled with equitable action for breach of fiduciary duty, action merits jury trial), as does an
action for a declaratory judgment on the amount owing under a contract. An action brought
for declaratory relief does not obscure the essentially legal nature of the underlying issues if the
questions involved are traditional common law issues that should be submitted to a jury. See,
eg., Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963) (Oklahoma law; jury trial granted for declara-
tory action); Johnson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 238 F.2d 322, 324 (8th Cir. 1956) (Minnesota
law). The same principal applies for an accounting under a contract for a money judgment.
See, eg., Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 476-77 (1962) (Pennsylvania law; claim for
amount due under contract wholly legal in nature thus jury trial mandated). The only con-
tract action that is not legal in nature but equitable, and thus does not require a jury, is an
action for specific performance through an injunction. See, e.g., Klein v. Shell Oil Co., 386
F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cir. 1967) (Minnesota law); Rash v. Peoples Deposit Bank & Trust Co., 192
F.2d 470, 471 (6th Cir. 1951) (Kentucky law), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 909 (1952). An action
for rescission, not of interest to a benefits-due lawsuit, may be legal or equitable, depending on
the remedy sought. 5 CORBIN, supra note 81, §§ 1102-1103, at 548-57.
One contract matter ordinarily is left to the court and not the jury, namely, interpretation
of the contract. E.g., Fashion House, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 892 F.2d 1076, 1083 (Ist Cir.
1989) (Michigan law); Ingram Coal Co. v. Mower Ltd. Partnership, 892 F.2d 363, 365 (4th
Cir. 1989) (West Virginia law); Technical Consultant Servs. v. Lakewood Pipe of Tex., Inc.,
861 F.2d 1357, 1362 (5th Cir. 1989) (Texas law); Brookhaven Landscape & Grading Co. v.
J.F. Barton Contracting Co., 681 F.2d 734, 735 (11th Cir. 1982) (Georgia law); Apponi v.
Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 652 F.2d 643, 651 n.12 (6th Cir. 1981) (Ohio law; pension plan is
contract). However, when the contract language is ambiguous, then a jury determines the
parties' intent from evidence. See, eg., Technical Consultant Serys., 861 F.2d at 1362 (submit-
ting question of intent to jury); Brookhaven Landscape & Grading Co., 681 F.2d at 735; ,Ap-
poni, 652 F.2d at 651 n.12; Nevets C.M., Inc. v. Nissho Iwai American Corp., 726 F. Supp.
525, 531 (D.N.J. 1989) (New Jersey law), aff'd, 899 F.2d 1218 (3d Cir. 1990). But a court, not
a jury, determines whether an ambiguity exists. E.g., Toren v. Braniff, Inc., 893 F.2d 763, 765
(5th Cir. 1990) (Texas law); Fashion House, Inc, 892 F.2d at 1083; Apponi, 652 F.2d at 651
n.12; PPG Indus. v. Shell Oil Co., 727 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. La. 1989) (Texas law); Nevets
C.M., Inc., 726 F. Supp. at 531; Williams v. National Can Corp., 603 F. Supp. 1268, 1275
(N.D. Ind. 1985) (Indiana law). Since benefits-due lawsuits frequently involve only plan inter-
pretation, see Flint, supra note 25, at 134 n.5, the employee-beneficiary might not obtain a jury
trial under contract law without an ambiguity.
89. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
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trust-like, and therefore equitable in nature,90 will not submit them to a
jury.
9 1
Most participant-beneficiaries fare better with a jury.92 Juries, an
expression of democracy,93 are generally unsympathetic to large corpora-
tions94 and insurance companies, 9' namely, the sometime plan sponsors
and frequent plan administrators. However, federal courts have a history
of hostility to the jury trial.96 Consequently, participant-beneficiaries file
90. Courts consider trust matters generally as equitable in nature since in pre-1791 Eng-
land they were brought in the chancery court. BAKER, supra note 88, at 242-44. So courts try
actions by beneficiaries involving trust matters without a jury, even when the only relief sought
is the recovery of money. E.g., Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461, 479 (1901) (Illinois law);
Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 228 (1872) (federal law); see Boone v. Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co., 163 F.2d 809, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (trust matters are for court of equity); 1
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197-198 (1959) (same). The exception to this rule is
an action in the nature of money had and received to obtain money immediately and uncondi-
tionally due, which is legal and carries a right to a jury trial. Id.; see Transamerica Occidental
Life Ins. Co. v. Digregorio, 811 F.2d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying rule to pension plan
and trust to permit jury trial).
91. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 44 (1988) (lawyers believe juries
are more generous than judges for plaintiffs); HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE COURT 72
(1959) (study of personal injury suits in New York City in 1950 showed juries award on aver-
age twice as much money as judges).
93. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 281, 283 (Henry Reeve trans.,
1840) (jury places direction of society in hands of governed, not government); GUINTHER,
supra note 92, at 27 (result of Bushel's case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 89 Eng. Rep. 2 (1670)); id. at
220 (describing jury "as an instrument of the people to invoke changes in public policy and
private conduct"); 7 THOMAS A. JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 422-23 (1903) (letter dated July 19,
1789, explaining that it is better to have people affect execution of laws through juries than in
making laws); 12 THOMAS A. JEFFERSON, PAPERS 425, 440, 558 (1955) (various letters 1787-
1788 expressing necessity of civil jury trial in Constitution to protect people's liberty); Patrick
E. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial Power,
56 TEx. L. REV. 47, 58-60 (1977) (describing jury as democratic check on judicial power).
94. See, e.g., GuINTHER, supra note 92, at xiv (explaining origins of anti-jury movement in
allegedly high awards in judgments against businesses); MARK A. PETERSON, CIVIL JURY
VERDICTS IN COOK COUNTY 35-37 (1984) (study of Chicago lawsuits indicated corporate de-
fendants pay two and one-half to four times more than do individuals when injuries are se-
vere); RAND CORPORATION, REPORT ON THE FIRST FOUR YEARS 20-21 (1984) (same, in San
Francisco).
95. Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 751
(1958) (discussing mock jury experiment in which plaintiff's recovery is greater when jury is
aware of defendant's insurance coverage); Philip D. Caldevone, Comment, Advertising the Eco-
nomics of High Jury Awards, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175, 1185 (1980) (discussing insur-
ance industry's advertising campaign to counter high jury awards against insureds); see
Michael A. Hatchell, Insurance Advertising: Much Ado about Nothing, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J.
427, 428-35 (1979) (discussing Texas state law restrictions on interjecting matter of insurance
in case); Thomas A. Vetter, Voir Dire IL Liability Insurance, 29 Mo. L. REV. 305, 307-16
(1964) (same, Missouri law).
96. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Piggly Wiggly Ala. Distrib. Co., 741 F. Supp. 1542, 1544-45
(N.D. Ala. 1990); Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils Inc., 739 F. Supp. 882, 889 (S.D.N.Y.
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their benefits-due lawsuits in state court where they find the right to jury
1990). Besides the ERISA lawsuit, the federal judicial system has engaged in three jury re-
strictive practices that some states have refused to follow, namely (1) the attempt to remove
complex litigation from the jury, (2) the disallowance of conscience verdicts by juries, and (3)
the failure to use the merger of law and equity to expand the right to a jury trial. Former Chief
Justice Burger advocated a complexity exception to the right to a jury trial. Donald P. Lay,
Can Our Jury System Survive, TRIAL, Sept. 1983, at 50. The federal system has used this
exception. E.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1090-91 (3d Cir.
1980); Las Vegas Sun Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 621 (9th Cir. 1979); Bernstein v.
Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 65-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp.
v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 444-48 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd on other grounds sub norm.
Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig.,
420 F. Supp. 99, 103-04 (W.D. Wash. 1976); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 248-49
(Alexander Hamilton) (Encyclopaedia Britannica ed. 1952) (advocating use of equity proceed-
ings for complicated matters). But see In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 424-
31 (9th Cir. 1979) (denying exception), cert. denied sub nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S.
929 (1980). See generally Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let'sNot Rush
to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68 (1981) (advocating no resolution of issue due to lack of
studies); Constance S. Huttner, Note, Unfit for Jury Determination: Complex Civil Litigation
and the Seventh Amendment Right of Trial by Jury, 20 B.C. L. REV. 511 (1979) (arguing
neither Seventh Amendment nor Due Process Clause provides constitutional justification for
striking demands for jury trial in complex civil cases presenting legal claims). The exception is
based on the idea that sophisticated business matters (especially accounting) were handled in
equity in pre-1791 England, but the only cases cited are those involving disputes not readily
remediable at law. See Blad v. Bahfield, 36 Eng. Rep. 922 (Ch. 1674) (within equitable juris-
diction as admiralty case); Townely v. Clench, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603) (equitable process
was needed to secure documents and testimony).
American juries early on had the right to disregard the common law in rendering their
decisions. See, e.g., Witter v. Brewster, Kirby 422, 423 (Conn. 1788) (civil trespass); JAMES
ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (17
How. St. Tr. 675 (1735)) 68-69, 72-74 (1735) (2d ed. Katz, 1972) (criminal); Preface, 1 D.
Chip. (Vt. 1824) (civil and criminal matters in Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island
and Vermont colonial juries). The Supreme Court however opposes this view, providing that
the jury must follow the law as instructed by the judge at least in criminal matters. E.g., Berra
v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 134-35 (1956); Sparf & Hanson v. United States, 156 U.S. 52,
101-03 (1895). See generally Leary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System, 54
TEx. L. REV. 488 (1976) (providing modem rationale against jury nullification in criminal
cases). Federal courts apply the rule in civil cases also. See, eg., Loew's Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d
641, 658-59 (9th Cir. 1950) (reversing prior decision which left question of law to jury), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 954 (1951); Union Bag & Paper Corp. v. Mitchell, 177 F.2d 909, 911 (5th Cir.
1949) (same); Wright v. Farm Journal, 158 F.2d 976, 978 (2d Cir. 1947) (same); Sprinkle v.
Davis, 104 F.2d 487, 489 (4th Cir. 1939) (same); see also Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167
F.2d 54, 58-59 (2d Cir.) (explaining arguments for and against jury nullification), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 816 (1948).
Prior to the merger of courts of law and equity, the right to a jury trial caused little
problem since the matter depended on the court in which the plaintiff filed the action. LARRY
TEPLEY & RALPH WHrTrEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 609 (1991). However, along with the
merger, problems would arise for mixed actions and actions conditioned on a result from the
other type of action. Id. When the federal courts began this merger in 1915, see Judiciary Act
of 1915, Pub. L. No. 63-278, 38 Stat. 956 (adding § 274(c) to Judiciary Act of 1911 to permit
equitable defenses to be interposed in actions at law), their goal was to prevent any expansion
of jury trial. See Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 242 (1922) (requiring
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trials to be more likely.9 7 To avoid the prospect of a jury trial, plan ad-
ministrators, in turn, remove the lawsuit as a federal cause of action to
federal court98 and then move to strike the jury request of the partici-
judge to try equitable defense). The adoption of the Federal Rules of Procedure in 1938 com-
pleted the merger with the goal that the rules not expand the right to jury trial. Fleming J.
James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 1022, 1025-26
(1936). See infra note 97 for the state reaction to these three matters.
97. Although generally the state judicial systems follow the federal lead concerning jury
restriction, states have not followed the complexity exception and a few states have expanded
the jury role by permitting jury nullification in criminal cases, namely, Indiana and Maryland,
and by permitting jury trials in equity cases, namely, Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana,
North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. State courts that have faced the complexity exception
to the right to a jury trial have denied it. E.g., Farmer v. Loofbourrow, 267 P.2d 113, 115
(Idaho 1954); Cloonan v. Goodrich, 167 P.2d 303, 314 (Kan. 1946); Estey v. Holdren, 267 P.
1098, 1099 (Kan. 1928); Nordeen v. Buck, 82 N.W. 644, 644 (Minn. 1900); M.J. Murphy &
Sons v. Peters, 62 A.2d 718, 719 (N.H. 1948); Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
127 A. 708, 710 (N.H. 1924); Daley v. Kennett, 78 A. 123, 124 (N.H. 1910); Watkins v. Siler
Logging Co., 116 P.2d 315, 322 (Wash. 1941).
Jury nullification for criminal matters is protected in the constitutions of Indiana and
Maryland. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 19; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § 23. See generally
Mark Dewolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 590-93 (1939)
(describing various states permitting jury nullification or forgiveness at various times).
All states but three have constitutional provisions preserving the right to a jury trial in
common law actions, with one of the remaining three preserving it through statute. See infra
note 176. These states are equal to the federal system. Seven states have constitutional or
statutory provisions extending it to equity actions. See infra note 183. These states exceed the
federal system. Moreover, states began the merger of law and equity with the code promul-
gated by David Dudley Field, first adopted in New York in 1848, see Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch.
379, § 208, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 536 ("[I]n an action for the recovery of money only, or of
specific real or personal property, there shall be an issue of fact, it must be tried by a jury."),
and widely adopted shortly thereafter elsewhere. See, e.g., Charles Cook, THE AMERICAN
CODIFICATION MOVEMENT (1981) (states and territories adopting the Field Procedural Code
before 1865 were Missouri, California, Kentucky, Iowa, Minnesota, Washington, Nebraska,
Wisconsin, Kansas, Georgia, Nevada, Dakota Territory, Idaho, Arizona and Montana); Flem-
ing J. James, Right to Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 665, 669-85 (1963). The pur-
pose of the Field Procedural Code was to increase the number of actions subject to a jury trial,
FIRST REPORT OF THE NEW YORK COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS 185
(1848) ("We propose an extension of the right of trial by jury to many cases, not within the
constitutional provision."), but the courts in the states adopting the Field Procedural Code
limited the right to a jury trial to the state's constitutional provision preserving the jury trial in
common law actions. James, supra, at 667 n.65.
98. Under the removal statute, plan administrators always have one ground for removal of
an ERISA case filed in state court to federal court, namely a plaintiff's exclusive federal cause
of action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441 (1989). An ERISA action arises exclusively under federal
law. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 67 (1987) (benefits-due law-
suit); Brown v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir. 1990) (denial of
benefits due); Ramirez v. Inter-Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d 760, 762 (5th Cir. 1989) (benefits-
due lawsuit); Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 588 (1st Cir. 1989) (retaliatory dis-
charge in violation of ERISA § 510); Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 893 (5th Cir.
1989) (benefits-due lawsuit); see, eg., Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968)
(employer injunction to enforce no-strike clause in collective bargaining agreement under
LMRA § 301); Jackson v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 641-42 (9th Cir. 1989) (dis-
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pant-beneficiary. 99
The main reason large entities fear juries is the possibility for extra-
contractual and punitive damages, which involve prejudicial issues. co
However, extra-contractual101 and punitive" 2 damages are not recover-
able in an ERISA action. Because these prejudicial damages are outside
the scope of the ERISA case, the jury should function well.1 13 More-
criminatory termination violating collective bargaining agreement under LMRA § 301);
Mitchell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, Inc., 772 F.2d 342, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1985) (same), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986); Oglesby v. RCA Corp., 752 F.2d 272, 275-78 (7th Cir. 1985)
(same).
With respect to the federal cause of action, a state cause of action is preempted by ERISA.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988); see,
e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44-46 (1987) (bad faith insurance claims
processing under long-term disability plan). Under the Avco doctrine, the plan administrator
may raise the federal cause of action for removal against a state cause of action by merely
alleging ERISA preemption in his answer. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63-67;
see Avco Corp., 390 U.S. at 560 n.2 (LMRA preemption alleged in answer to part of complaint
for purposes of well-pleaded complaint doctrine for determining removal for federal cause of
action). The right to a jury trial in removal cases is determined under federal law. Phillips v.
Moore, 100 U.S. 208, 213 (1879).
99. See, e.g., Fisher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 1073, 1076 (5th Cir. 1990)
(participant-beneficiary sought remand to state court to have jury trial); Farlow v. Union
Cent. Life Ins. Co., 874 F.2d 791, 792 (11th Cir. 1989) (same).
100. See GuINTHER, supra note 92, at 179 (size of jury verdicts prompted by severity of
plantiff's injury or outrage at defendant's conduct). In cases involving extra-contractual dam-
ages, such as pain and suffering and punitive damages, studies reveal that jurors are more
likely to accept plaintiff's claims for damages or add to pain and suffering. Id. at 97-98.
101. See, eg., Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); Johnson
v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 857 F.2d 514, 518 (9th Cir. 1988) (infliction of
emotional distress); Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 825 (1st Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 1986)
(same); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 780 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1985) (same),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986). See generally Diane M. Sumoski, Note, Participant and
Beneficiary Remedies Under ERISA: Extracontractual and Punitive Damages After Massachu-
setts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 1014 (1986) (advocating that
courts should permit extra-contractual damages).
102. See, e.g., Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 635 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989); Johnson, 857 F.2d
at 518; Drinkwater, 846 F.2d at 825; Sage v. Automation Inc. Pension Plan & Trust, 845 F.2d
885, 888 n.2 (10th Cir. 1988); Bishop v. Osborn Transp., Inc., 838 F.2d 1173, 1174 (1Ilth Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988); Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 817 (6th Cir. 1987); Klein-
hans v. Lisle Say. Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 618, 627 (7th Cir. 1987); Sommers Drug
Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enterprises, Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1464-
65 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987); Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Long-
Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1986); Powell, 780 F.2d at 424;
Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 653 F.2d 1208, 1216 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968,
1084 (1981); see also Deborah A. Geier, Comment, ERISA: Punitive Damages for Breach in
Favor of Fiduciary Duty, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 743 (1985) (arguing in favor of recovery of
punitive damages); Sumoski, Note, supra note 101 (arguing against recovery of punitive
damages).
103. See GORDON BERMANT ET AL., PROTRACTED CIVIL TRIALS: VIEWS FROM THE
BENCH AND BAR 26 (1981) (even in complicated cases "the jury had made the correct decision
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over, modem courts have numerous techniques for controlling juries,
such as motions to dismiss," 4 motions for judgments on the pleadings,1"5
motions for summary judgment, 106 exclusion of evidence, 0 7 directed ver-
dicts,"'8 jury instructions, 10 9 special verdicts, 110 motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict 1 and motions for new trial.112 Litigants
and courts should thus encounter few problems handling the benefits-due
lawsuit by jury trial.
III. COURT DECISIONS
Several appellate courts have considered whether a litigant may re-
quire a jury trial for ERISA nongovernmental, civil lawsuits. Whether a
remedy pursuant to a congressional enactment requires a jury trial ordi-
narily depends on whether the litigant files the lawsuit in federal or state
court.
A. Jury Determination Principles
Federal law determines the right to a jury trial in federal court, even
when the cause of action arises under state law. 1 3 A federal law deter-
nuination involves two considerations. First, did Congress intend, either
explicitly or implicitly, that the remedy require a jury trial?11 If not,
does the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution require a
jury trial?1 15
The United States Supreme Court has developed a method for deter-
... [and] had no difficulty applying the legal standards to the facts"); GUINTHER, supra note
92, at 101-02 (studies show that juries do their job well in civil cases).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
107. FED. R. EVID. 104.
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 51.
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a). See generally TEPLEY & WHITrEN, supra note 96, at 607.
113. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (right to jury trial in federal courts deter-
mined under federal law in diversity actions); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S.
525, 537-40 (1958) (jury trial permitted where state law denies jury trial but federal courts
permit jury trial); Herron v. Southern Pac. R.R., 283 U.S. 91, 94-95 (1931) (federal courts not
bound by state law requiring jury trial). See generally 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2303 (1971) (noting it is clear that federal
law determines right to jury trial in federal court but acknowledging substantial authority to
contrary).
114. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 365-66 (1974); accord Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (court will construe statute to avoid constitutional issue).
115. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195.
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mining whether the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial. 116 Con-
gressionally created causes of action" 7 that are analogous to "suits at
common law" prior to adoption of the Seventh Amendment in 1791 re-
quire a jury trial. 8 Actions that are analogous to suits tried in equity or
admiralty prior to 1791 do not require a jury trial. 19 To make this deter-
mination the Court looks to both the nature of the action and the remedy
sought. First the Court makes a comparison of actions.' 20 Second the
Court examines the remedy sought.'
21
In contrast, state law determines the right to a jury trial in state
court even when the cause of action arises under federal law.' 22 An ex-
ception is if the right to a jury trial is a substantial part of the substantive
rights accorded by federal statute.1 2 1 Thus, the state law determination
involving a federal cause of action, such as a benefits-due lawsuit, in-
volves three considerations. The first consideration is the same as under
federal law: did Congress intend the cause of action to have a right to
jury trial?124 Second and third, does a state constitution or a state statute
require a jury trial?' 25
In applying the principles for determining the right to a jury trial,
courts use the same two approaches used by the pre-ERISA courts. The
federal courts analogize the employee benefit program to multi-employer
116. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1349
(1990); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-19 (1987).
117. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193-94.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 193-95; Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830).
120. Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1348; accord Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 371-79
(1974) (examining actions); Dairy Queen Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 (1962) (examining
legal issues).
121. Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1345; accord Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194-98; Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531, 542 (1970).
122. See, e.g., Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 189-90 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Herron v. Southern Pac. R.R., 283 U.S. 91, 93 (1931); Southern Ry. v. Durham, 266 U.S. 178,
179 (1924); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 56 (1919); Minneapolis & St.
L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 221 (1916) (less than unanimous under Federal Employer's
Liability Act of 1908, ch. 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59
(1988)).
123. E.g., Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (state of Ohio cannot deny
jury trial in FELA action); Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943) (same,
Vermont).
124. See, eg., Brown, 321 U.S. at 189-91.
125. The Seventh Amendment does not apply to state courts. See Fay v. New York, 332
U.S. 261, 288 (1947); see also Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226, 232 (1923)
(holding petitioner's claim of entitlement to have cause heard before full court erroneous be-
cause it was matter of Missouri law); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 207-08
(1917) (holding denial of trial by jury not inconsistent with due process).
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plans.126 In certain instances pre-ERISA law applied trust law to multi-
employer plans, since LMRA specifically requires them to be in trust
form. 27 Thus, federal courts conclude that employee benefit programs
are trust-like in nature and consequently the ERISA actions are equitable
actions, which generally do not require a jury trial.1 28 In contrast, state
courts continue to use their pre-ERISA law that applied contract law. 129
State courts therefore conclude that employee benefit programs are con-
tractual in nature and consequently the ERISA actions generally are ac-
tions at law, which require a jury trial.
B. Federal Decisions
Most federal courts deny a jury trial for benefits-due lawsuits under
ERISA. Their decisions derive solely from Wardle v. Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund.13 0 This is a poorly reasoned
opinion. In Wardle the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that
ERISA does not contain an express provision that grants a right to a jury
trial and rejected two arguments that ERISA impliedly granted such a
right.
1 3 1
1. The fallacious federal argument against jury trial
The court in Wardle relied on a statutory implication argument in-
volving an invalid legal proposition. Wardle asserted that the statutory
scheme mandates only legal, not factual issues.1 32 A benefits-due lawsuit
can only arise to review a plan administrator's discretionary action,
133
which, reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard, is a legal
question for the judge, not a factual question for the jury.3 This is not
126. See, e.g., Flint, supra note 25, at 166 & n.155 (explaining that in each circuit first
ERISA cases for review of fiduciary actions involved multi-employer plans so these courts
adopted LMRA legal precedence for ERISA plans).
127. See supra note 85.
128. See, e.g., Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820,
823-24 (7th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981); accordIn re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318,
320-21 (8th Cir. 1982); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1980).
129. See supra note 84.
130. 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). Wardle involved a
plan administrator's denial of an owner-operator's application for retirement benefits under a
jointly-administered union plan on the ground that the participant had a break-in-service. Id.
at 823. The participant sued under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and not LMRA, for the amount of
the benefit, punitive damages and attorney's fees. Id.
131. Id. at 828-30. See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text for the two arguments
and disparagements.
132. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 828-29.
133. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
134. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829-30.
January 1992]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:361
the law.
The review standard mandated by the Supreme Court in dicta in
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch is the abuse of discretion stan-
dard."'5 This standard reduces to the arbitrary and capricious rule only
for the disinterested, properly motivated plan administrator, which is the
case only for some multi-employer plans.1 36 The correct standard in-
volves fact questions concerning the interest and motives of the plan ad-
ministrator, as well as the possibility of selecting the best decision of
several possible logical ones.1 7 The result-denial of jury trial-also is
not the correct law for contracts with a discretionary provision, although
it is for trusts with a discretionary provision. Thus, denial of a jury trial
may have been correct based on the type of action, but not based on the
issues involved.138
The court in Wardle continued by noting that the Supreme Court
declared review of a federal administrator's discretionary action incom-
patible with a jury trial.139 Presumedly, that rule should also apply to
135. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
136. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
Employee-participants have urged the recent recognition by the Supreme Court of this
expanded abuse of discretion review standard to obtain jury trials in federal court. See supra
notes 71-79 and accompanying text. However, rather than use the correct jurisprudence to
disregard their impliedly overruled prior review standard of arbitrary and capricious, these
federal courts continue to follow the arbitrary and capricious standard and deny jury trials.
E.g., Blake v. Union Mut. Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990); Wise v.
Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., 751 F. Supp. 90, 92 (W.D.N.C. 1990); Pardini v. Southern
Nev. Culinary & Bartenders Pension Plan & Trust, 733 F. Supp. 1402, 1403 (D. Nev. 1990).
But see Resnick v. Resnick, 763 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (successful).
137. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
138. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
139. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 830; eg., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1974) (com-
menting on earlier decision to that effect for review of proceedings of federal administrative
body, those of NLRB).
This is a strange position. First, plan administrators are not disinterested, see supra notes
20-25 and accompanying text, as are administrative law judges.
Second, contract actions for money owed under a contract or an interpretation of a con-
tract are very similar to the benefits-due lawsuit. Courts handle the analogous contractual
situations under contract law with a jury trial, even though using the arbitrary and capricious
portion of the abuse of discretion review standard. Courts have even prepared jury instruc-
tions in contract cases relative to review these discretionary determinations.
Courts uphold the architect's or engineer's decision under a construction contract unless
he or she acts fraudulently or makes such a gross mistake as to imply bad faith or fails to
exercise an honest judgment. See supra note 82. Whether the architect or engineer has failed
to meet this standard is determined under contract law by a jury trial. E.g., Continental Casu-
alty Co. v. Wilson-Avery, Inc., 156 S.E.2d 152, 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); James I. Barnes
Constr. Co. v. Washington Township, 184 N.E.2d 763, 764 (Ind. App. 1962); Public Water
Supply Dist. No. 8 v. Maryland Casualty Co., 478 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Mo. 1972) (jury waived),
modified on other grounds, 513 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. 1974); Antrim Lumber Co. v. Bowline, 460
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private plan administrators. The Supreme Court, however, excludes en-
forcement of statutory rights for a civil action in a district court from this
rule.1" Since benefits-due lawsuits brought under ERISA are civil ac-
tions to enforce a statutory right, they are thus not incompatible with
trial by jury.14
As to constitutional considerations, the court in Wardle asserted
P.2d 914, 919 (Okla. 1969); Travis-Williamson County Water Control & Improvement Dist.
No. 1 v. Page, 358 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 367 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1963). Thus, courts instruct juries:
[T]he court further instructs the jury that, if they believe from the evidence [that
estimates were fixed as provided in the contract] said estimates must be considered by
the jury as the correct prices, unless the jury further believes from the evidence that,
in approving said estimates and in making his decision in reference thereto, and in
giving the certificate approving the same, the said engineer was guilty of intentional
fraud, or of such gross mistake as to necessarily imply bad faith on his part.
2 HENRY RANDALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES IN CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL CASES § 1317 (1922) (citing Norfolk & W.R.R. v. Mills, 22 S.E. 556 (Va. 1895)
(second part of abuse of discretion review standard)).
Courts uphold the buyer's satisfaction decision under a sales contract unless he or she acts
in bad faith or fails to exercise an honest judgment. See supra note 83. Sellers bring the action
against the allegedly dissatisfied buyer as a breach of contract claim and so try them before a
jury. See, e.g., Meredith Corp. v. Design & Lithography Center, Inc., 614 P.2d 414, 415
(Idaho 1980) (jury waived); Frankfort Distilleries, Inc. v. Bums Bottling Mach. Works, 197
A. 599, 601 (Md. 1938); Alper Blouse Co. v. E.E. Conner & Co., 127 N.E.2d 813, 815, reh'g
denied, 130 N.E.2d 598 (N.Y. 1955); Fulcher v. Nelson, 159 S.E.2d 519, 522-23 (N.C. 1968);
see also Fidelity Fuel Co. v. Martin Howe Coal Co., 15 F.2d 470, 470 (7th Cir. 1926) (triable
before jury). Thus, courts instruct juries:
The jury [is] instructed.., that, under the above condition of the contract, if [the
jury] believe[s] from the evidence that defendant refused to accept the said machines
on the ground that it was dissatisfied with them, and that, in so acting, the defendant
exercised good faith and was honestly dissatisfied, then you should find for defend-
ant, although you may believe that the defendant did not have reasonable grounds
for such dissatisfaction.
5 RANDALL, supra, § 4657(2) (citing Inman Mfg. Co. v. American Cereal Co., 100 N.W. 860
(Iowa 1904) (both parts of abuse of discretion standard)).
Similarly, courts have fashioned jury instructions for the review of plan administrator's
decisions under a pension plan. See, eg., Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1005 (4th
Cir. 1985) (jury made arbitrary and capricious finding for long-term disability plan under
ERISA); Seafarers Pension Plan v. Sturgis, 630 F.2d 218, 221 (4th Cir. 1980) (jury made
arbitrary and capricious finding for disability plan under LMRA); see also Sommers Drug
Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan, 883 F.2d 345, 350-53 (5th Cir. 1989)
(formulating fiduciary responsibility jury instructions).
Jurors ordinarily have difficulty understanding jury instructions when couched in legal
language; however, when instructions are written using simple language, juror comprehension
rises dramatically. Amiram Elkwork & Bruce D. Sales, Jury Instructions, in SAUL KASSIN &
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND COURTROOM PROCEDURE
280-97 (1984) (comprehension for mock juries in civil trials increased from 40% to 78%).
140. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
141. E.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988).
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that trust law governs pension plans.142 Trust law provides exclusively
for an equitable remedy with one exception.143 A legal remedy exists for
the beneficiary only for monies due unconditionally and immediately,
144
which, according to Wardle, is not the case for a pension payable in the
future over years. 145 A jury trial is available only in this situation. Ben-
efits-due lawsuits, therefore, even when involving questions of fact, are
equitable and hence do not require a jury trial.
146
The court provided some erroneous propositions to support this
conclusion. It claimed that state courts had traditionally dealt with ben-
efits-due lawsuits under the law of trusts, but cited no cases previously
decided under state law. 47 The reason is clear. Investigation of pre-
ERISA state cases reveals that most courts viewed benefits-due lawsuits
as contractual, 148 and hence most state courts did not use trust law for
benefits-due cases. The court in Wardle further claimed that federal
courts followed the state courts in treating benefits-due cases under trust
law when entertaining them under diversity jurisdiction.1 49 In support,
the court cited only LMRA cases,150 which courts handle as a federal
cause of action, not a state cause of action with diversity. 5 Again the
reason is clear. Investigation of diversity actions indicates that they fol-
lowed state courts in treating benefits-due lawsuits as contractual. 152 Ac-
142. Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 824 (7th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981).
143. See infra note 144.
144. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 (1959) ("Except as stated in § 198, the
remedies of the beneficiary against the trustee are exclusively equitable."); id. § 198 ("If the
trustee is under a duty to pay money immediately and unconditionally to the beneficiary, the
beneficiary can maintain an action at law against the trustee to enforce payment."). This legal
trust action derived from the common law writs of debt and general assumpsit. Jefferson Nat'l
Bank v. Central Nat'l Bank, 700 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1983); Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l
Bank, 297 F. Supp. 485, 489 (D. Minn. 1969).
145. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829.
146. Id. at 828-30.
147. Id at 829.
148. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989); see infra notes 205-08
and accompanying text.
149. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829.
150. 1d; see Genesta v. San Diego County Laborers' Pension Plan, 28 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1001, 1002 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (disability benefits from jointly-administered union
plan under LMRA; arbitrary and capricious is question of law); Porter v. Central States, S.E.
& S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1504, 1505 (N.D. Iowa 1978)
(pension from jointly-administered union plan under LMRA; follows Restatement trust rule);
Davis v. Huge, 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2234, 2235-36 (E.D. Ky. 1975) (same); Sichko v. Lewis,
191 F. Supp. 68, 69 (W.D. Pa. 1960) (same).
151. See supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
152. See Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 652 F.2d 643, 650 (6th Cir. 1981) (pre-ERISA
pension plan is contract so remand for jury trial on ambiguous language), cert. denied, 484
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cording to the court in Wardle, ERISA merely provides a federal forum
for these trust lawsuits.153 The court presumed that Congress intended
to preserve this state law.154 If this presumption is true, the result should
be opposite. Thus, the court in Wardle not only failed to make an ade-
quate case for the nonjury trial, but used dishonorable methods to thwart
jury trial.
2. Other federal decisions
Nevertheless most circuit courts, lemming-like, have followed the
Wardle decision in various forms rather than recognize its fallacious rea-
soning, a reasonable basis for disregarding it as precedent.155 The
Fourth 5 6 and Eighth 5 7 Circuits have mistakenly asserted that the ab-
U.S. 820 (1987); Wyper v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 533 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1976)
(tried to jury following Connecticut's contractual approach for pension claim); Golden v. Ken-
tile Floors, Inc., 512 F.2d 838, 846-47 (5th Cir. 1975) (nonjury trial following New York's
contractual approach for pension claim); Bradford v. New York Times Co., 501 F.2d 51, 60-61
(2d Cir. 1975) (same for incentive compensation plan); Matthews v. Swift & Co., 465 F.2d 814,
816-18 (5th Cir. 1972) (following New York's contractual approach for disability pension);
Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1971) (following Virginia's con-
tractual approach for pension claim).
153. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829.
154. IdL
155. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADrrON 86-87 (1960)
(explaining disregard of precedent due to faulty foundation, implied overruling or misapplica-
tion of legal principles).
156. See, eg., Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (4th Cir. 1985). In Berry
an employee sued to challenge a plan administrator's decision to terminate long-term disability
benefits, presumedly under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Id The trial court had permitted a jury
trial and the jury made the "arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or made in bad faith" finding.
Id. at 1006. The Berry court concluded, however, that "arbitrary and capricious" is too diffi-
cult a concept for a court to communicate to jurors and so a private administrative scheme,
such as that mandated by ERISA is "incompatible with a jury trial scheme." Id. at 1007;
accord Dameron v. Sinai Hosp., 815 F.2d 975, 981 (4th Cir. 1987). However, state courts have
no such problem. See supra note 139 for (1) courts addressing contract provisions permitting
discretion which let jurors decide the arbitrary and capricious issue and (2) jury instructions
on "arbitrary and capricious."
District courts in the Fourth Circuit have generally concluded similarly. See, eg., Ques-
inberry v. Individual Banking Group Accident Ins. Plan, 737 F. Supp. 38, 40 (W.D. Va. 1990)
(estate sued insurance company as plan administrator for accidental death benefit); Trogner v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 633 F. Supp. 503, 511 (D. Md. 1986) (participant sued for denied
disability benefit); see also Dameron v. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1404, 1415-16 (D. Md.
1984) (ERISA actions for benefits due are equitable so that doctrine of laches applies), aff'd,
815 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1989); Kolata v. United Mine Workers, 533 F. Supp. 313, 319-20 (S.D.
W. Va.) (arbitrary and capricious review of trustee's plan interpretation reducing benefits is for
court, not jury), aff'd, 696 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1982).
157. In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 321-22 (8th Cir. 1982). In Vorpahl present and future
employees sued for future and current benefits under a retirement plan under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B). Id. at 319. The court concluded that such lawsuits do not involve any factual
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sence of factual issues in benefits-due lawsuits does not require a jury.
The Third,' Sixth 159 and Eleventh' 6° Circuits have examined the rem-
issues so denial of a jury request was proper. Id. at 321. However, state courts do not agree.
See infra notes 178-81, 184-89 for courts submitting the lawsuit to jury determination.
District courts in the Eighth Circuit have generally concluded similarly. See, e.g.,
Bohlmann v. Logos Sch., 669 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (employee sued plan adminis-
trator for medical benefits); Hollenbeck v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 605 F. Supp. 421, 431 (E.D.
Mo.) (widow sued employer for benefit due), aff'd, 780 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1985); Hechenberger
v. Western Elec. Co., 570 F. Supp. 820, 822 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (employee sued trustee for denial
of benefits), aff'd, 742 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1212 (1985).
158. Turner v. CF & I Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 43, 47 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1058 (1986). In Turner retired employees of one plan in a merged entity sued for increased
pensions from a second plan under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Id. at 44, 46. The court noted that
most benefits-due lawsuits involved a nonfactual abuse of discretion standard incompatible
with a jury trial. Id. at 46. Under the remedy test, however, these lawsuits seek an equitable
remedy and hence require no jury. Id. at 47; accord Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d
649-50 (3d Cir.) (former employee sued for medical insurance benefit; suit involved appeal
power, seeking equitable remedy), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 47 (1990); Pane v. RCA Corp., 868
F.2d 631, 636 (3d Cir. 1989) (former employees sued for severance pay; enforced by in per-
sonam or contempt so seeking equitable remedy). Normally, seeking money due under a con-
tract is a legal remedy. See supra note 88.
District courts in the Third Circuit have generally concluded similarly. See, e.g., Haeffele
v. Hercules Inc., 703 F. Supp. 326, 331 (D. Del. 1989) (former employee challenged denial of
early retirement); Young v. AT&T Transition Protection Payment Plan, 10 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) 1920 (D.N.J. 1989) (former employee sued for severance benefits for reorganiza-
tion termination); Gilliken v. Hughes, 609 F. Supp. 178, 181 (D. Del. 1985) (beneficiary sued
plan administrator for benefits). Some district courts have described the rule for denying jury
trial as a per se rule: if the case involves an ERISA cause of action, there is no right to a jury
trial. See Foulke v. Bethlehem 1980 Salaried Pension Plan, 565 F. Supp. 882, 883 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (participant sued for lump sum from pension plan; follows per se rule).
159. Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 268 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 826 (1988).
In Daniel a former employee challenged the denial of early retirement benefits, presumedly
under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Id. at 265. The court noted that for recovery of benefits there is
no right to a jury, citing a prior case using the equitable remedy test for another type of ERISA
lawsuit. Id. at 268 (citing Crews v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 788 F.2d
332, 338 (6th Cir. 1986) (employer sought contribution refund under ERISA § 502(a)(3)));
accord Bair v. General Motors Corp., 895 F.2d 1094, 1097 (6th Cir. 1990) (former employee
sued for special early retirement benefits; no right to jury trial even if contract issues involved).
District courts in the Sixth Circuit have generally concluded similarly. See, e.g., Cowden
v. Montgomery County Soc'y for Cancer Control, 591 F. Supp. 740, 747 (S.D. Ohio 1984)
(employee sued plan administrator for benefits); Diano v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas
Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 551 F. Supp. 861, 862-63 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (owner-employee
sued for benefits due under jointly-administered union pension plan under ERISA, not
LMRA; only equitable remedy available to beneficiaries of trust fund).
160. Blake v. Union Mutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990). In
Blake an employee sued to recover additional benefits under a group health policy under
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). id. at 1526. Since this action involved the ordering of continuing
benefits, it was an equitable action and hence no jury was required. Id.; accord Chilton v.
Savannah Foods & Indus., 814 F.2d 620, 623-24 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (former employee sued for
retirement benefit; no jury required); Howard v. Parisian, Inc. 807 F.2d 1560, 1567 (1 1th Cir.
1987) (former employee sued for additional health care under welfare plan; no jury required).
District courts in the Eleventh Circuit have generally concluded similarly. See, e.g., Lips-
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edy sought, erroneously deemed it equitable, and denied a jury trial. The
Fifth,161 Eleventh "62 and Ninth1 63 Circuits have followed the trust law
comb v. Transac, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (employee sued for long-term
disability benefits); Springer v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Group Health Plan, 714 F. Supp. 1168,
1169 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (employee sued for health benefits; but used advisory jury), rev'd on
other grounds, 908 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1990); Tucker v. Employers Life Ins. Co., 689 F. Supp.
1073, 1077 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (participant sued under employer's plan that had been switched
from group insurance to individual insurance); Whitt v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 676 F.
Supp. 1119, 1134 (N.D. Ala. 1987) (participants sued for benefits due under private company
plans); Chambers v. Kaleidoscope, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan & Trust, 650 F. Supp. 359, 378
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (participant in private company plan sued for breach of fiduciary duty and
failure to distribute benefits; jury trial unavailable for punitive damages); Zittrouer v. Uarco
Inc. Group Benefit Plan, 582 F. Supp. 1471, 1478 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (widow sued plan adminis-
trator for medical benefits); Chastain v. Delta Air Lines, 496 F. Supp. 979, 985 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (widow sued plan administrator for disability and survivor benefit); see also Jordan v.
Reliable Life Ins. Co., 694 F. Supp. 822, 827-28 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (dicta) (widow sued insur-
ance company for non-payment of accidental death benefits); McKinnon v. Blue Cross-Blue
Shield, 691 F. Supp. 1314, 1315 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (same), aff'd, 874 F.2d 820 (1lth Cir. 1989)
(deceased's representative sued insurance company to recover deceased's medical expenses);
Amos v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 681 F. Supp. 1515, 1518 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (same), rev'd on
other grounds, 868 F.2d 430 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 855 (1989) (beneficiaries sued to
recover money allegedly due them under employee benefit plans).
The court in Whitt had earlier concluded that a suit for benefits was legal in nature and so
had decided to allow jury trial, but reconsidered after finding Chilton. Whitt, 676 F. Supp. at
1132. A significant number of opinions from district courts in the Eleventh Circuit assert that
jury denial is error. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Lewis, 753 F. Supp. 345, 348 (N.D.
Ala. 1990); Rhodes v. Piggly Wiggly Ala. Distrib. Co., 741 F. Supp. 1542, 1545-46 (N.D. Ala.
1990); Porter v. Mutual Serv. Life Ins. Co., No. CV-PT-700-S, 1990 WL 174716, at *3 (N.D.
Ala. June 26, 1990); Gangitano v. NN Investors Life Ins. Co., 733 F. Supp. 342, 343 (S.D. Fla.
1990).
161. Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1980). In Calamia an employee sued
for a declaration that a disability benefit was higher than that paid from a jointly-administered
union pension plan under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), without suing under LMRA. Id. at 1236.
The court stated that it concurred with Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension
Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). Calamia, 632
F.2d at 1237.
District courts in the Fifth Circuit have generally concluded similarly. See, e.g., Fonner
v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 747 F. Supp. 340, 341-42 (M.D. La. 1990) (retiree sued for past-due
retirement benefits); Stage v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., Civ. A. 89-1251, 1990 WL 32941, at *1,
*3 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 1990) (employee sued under accidental death and disability plan); Moffit
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1391, 1395 (N.D. Miss. 1989) (employee
challenged termination of health benefits upon severance); Juckett v. Beecham Home Improve-
ment Prods., Inc., 684 F. Supp. 448, 452 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (beneficiary sued for benefits due);
Sublett v. Premier Bancorp Self-Funded Medical Plan, 683 F. Supp. 153, 155 (M.D. La. 1988)
(employee sued plan administrator for medical benefits).
162. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829; accord Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton
Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 1986) (employee sued for disability benefits due;
no jury required), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 (1987); Jefferson Nat'l Bank v. Central Nat'l
Bank, 700 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1983) (former employee sued for lump-sum vested benefit;
lawsuit fits trust law legal remedy so jury trial required).
District courts in the Seventh Circuit generally have concluded similarly. See, e.g., Al-
lison v. Duggan, 737 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (retiree sued for suspended retire-
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rule, permitting a jury trial only for unconditional and immediately paya-
ble benefits. The First,1" Second 165 and Tenth 16 6 Circuits have yet to
ment benefits); Grodsky v. Benefit Trust Life Ins., No. 89 C 463, 1990 WL 36261, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 5, 1990) (widow sued for health and life insurance benefits); Ovitz v. Jefferies & Co.,
553 F. Supp. 300, 301 (N.D. IM. 1982) (employee sued plan administrator for additional
amounts from profit-sharing plan; unconditional and immediate so have jury trial under trust
law's legal remedy); see also Senn v. AMCA Int'l, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,637 (E.D. Wis.
Sept. 10, 1990) (retirees sued for health and life insurance benefits; but used advisory jury).
163. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Digregorio, 811 F.2d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir.
1987). In Transamerica an insurer sued derivatively on behalf of a beneficiary for a declara-
tion that its policy had no double indemnity with respect to that beneficiary, presumedly under
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Id. at 1251-52. Since this action requested a ruling on whether a bene-
fit was unconditionally due and immediately payable, it fit the trust law's legal remedy and a
jury was required. Id. at 1252; accord Nevill v. Shell Oil Co., 835 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir.
1987) (former employees sued employer for denied severance pay; no jury required); Blau v.
Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1357 (9th Cir.) (former employees sued employer for benefits
due under welfare plan; no jury required), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985).
District'courts in the Ninth Circuit generally have concluded similarly. See, e.g., Pardini
v. Southern Nev. Culinary and Bartenders Pension Plan & Trust, 733 F. Supp. 1402, 1403 (D.
Nev. 1990) (beneficiary sued for benefits); see also Weinfurther v. Source Servs. Corp. Employ-
ees Profit-Sharing Plan & Trust, 759 F. Supp. 599, 601 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (dicta) (former em-
ployees sued to recover benefits accrued during employment).
164. In the First Circuit only district courts have considered the matter. Several of these
courts have followed the trust law legal remedy rule to deny jury trials. See, e.g., Fuller v.
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 733 F. Supp. 462, 464 (D. Mass. 1990) (employee challenging
denial of medical benefits not entitled to jury trial); Turner v. Leesona Corp., 673 F. Supp. 67,
70 (D.R.I. 1987) (employee suing for benefit from former employer's group long-term disabil-
ity policy; no jury required); Wilson v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 670 F. Supp. 52, 54 (D.
Me. 1987) (husband sued for benefits due from deceased wife's employer's life insurance plan;
no jury required); Strout v. GTE Prod. Corp., 618 F. Supp. 444, 445 (D. Me. 1985) (employee
suing for benefits from former employer's pension and welfare plans; ERISA suit essentially
based on law of trusts, not contracts; no jury required).
Some courts have even suggested that if a plan administrator denies eligibility, that alone
defeats a jury trial since the unconditional provision is not satisfied. Turner, 673 F. Supp. at 70
(trust law's legal remedy inapplicable when contested eligibility involved); Wilson, 670 F.
Supp. at 54 (trust law's legal remedy inapplicable when entitlement denial involved).
Presumedly the denial is in good faith, not bad faith. The right to a jury trial should depend
on the participant-beneficiary's cause of action, not prior action of the plan administrator. See
supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
These courts provide the reason that the case involves interpretation of the trust docu-
ment. Turner, 673 F. Supp. at 70. Traditionally, this was done under the same principles as
those in contract law. See supra note 87. Contract interpretation is a question of law for the
judge unless there is an ambiguity, in which case a jury determines the interpretation. See
supra note 86. Therefore, the judge must find that the plan administrator made a possible
error, there being more than one logical result, then submit the issue to a jury on the abuse of
discretion standard.
165. An examination of Second Circuit suits involving other types of ERISA lawsuits indi-
cates that the Second Circuit follows the remedy test. Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984). In Katsaros an employee sued under ERISA
§ 502(a)(3) for equitable relief of trustee removal and restitution to plan for breaches of fiduci-
ary duty in making loans from the plan. Id. The court distinguished that case from the
mooted ruling in Pollock v. Castrovinci, 476 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd mem., 622
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address the problem.
Not all the federal courts have reached the same conclusion as the
court in Wardle. The first decision under ERISA to address whether
benefits-due actions require a jury trial, Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters
Joint Council No. 43,167 determined that Congress implicitly intended
courts to try some ERISA actions by jury. 6 The court in Stamps ex-
amined two indications of this intent. First, the legislative scheme sets
forth two remedies for the participant-one for an injunction and the
other for benefits. 69 The injunctive relief clearly was intended to be eq-
uitable with no right to a jury trial, so in order for the other not to be
surplusage, it must relate to legal remedies that require a jury trial.
170
F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1980). Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 278-79. In Katsaros the remedy sought deter-
mined the outcome. In Pollock the court affirmed the lower court's mandate of a jury trial for
determination of a benefit amount. However, as the court in Katsaros pointed out, the trial
never occurred because the trial court on remand decided the equitable question, reformation
of the plan, to avoid the legal question. Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 278-79.
Consequently, some district courts in the Second Circuit have found the participant-bene-
ficiary seeking equitable remedies and, as a result, denied a jury. See, eg., Gardella v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 627, 629 (D. Conn. 1988) (employee sought benefits due); In re
Emhart Corp., 706 F. Supp. 153, 155-56 (D. Conn. 1988) (former employees sued to recover
severance pay; suit for benefits is equitable); Nobile v. Pension Comm. of Pension Plan, 611 F.
Supp. 725, 727-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (executor sued for death benefit from deceased's em-
ployer's pension plan; trust law's legal remedy inapplicable when trust document interpreta-
tion involved); Ruben v. Decision Concepts, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1057, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(employee sued for termination benefit from profit-sharing plan; trust law's legal remedy inap-
plicable when amount of damages is involved).
A significant number of opinions from the district courts in the Second Circuit assert the
jury denial is error. See infra note 173.
166. The Tenth Circuit did note that the other circuits that have considered the issue denied
the right to a jury trial. Peckham v. Board of Trustees of the Int'l Bd. of Painters & Allied
Trades Union, 653 F.2d 424, 426 n.3 (10th Cir. 1981).
Some district courts in the Tenth Circuit have found the participant-beneficiary seeking
equitable remedies and so denied a jury trial. See, e.g., Bass v. Prudential Ins. Co., 751 F.
Supp. 192, 194 (D. Kan. 1990) (beneficiary sued for benefits); Porterfield v. Deffenbaugh In-
dus., No. Civ. A. 88-2385-S, 1988 WL 143436, at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 13, 1988) (employee sued
for denied medical benefits).
167. 431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (retired employee sued for benefits under LMRA
and ERISA for benefits due and owing).
168. ItL at 747.
169. ERISA provides essentially two participant remedies: (1) the right to recover benefits,
enforce rights and clarify rights, all under the terms of the plan, Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988); and (2) injunctive and
other equitable relief, id. § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
170. The argument is that the benefit claim action provision would be surplusage if it also
provided only equitable relief. See Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Digregorio, 811
F.2d 1249, 1251 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (claim for benefits under life insurance contract is legal
remedy); Pollock v. Castrovinci, 476 F. Supp. 606, 608-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (approving argu-
ment).
One commentator believes enforcement and clarification of rights are equitable. See
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:361
The second indication was ERISA's legislative history that required
courts to follow LMRA procedures, 171 permitting a jury trial. 72 A few
district courts have followed Stamps' lead.'1
3
Note, supra note 6, at 756. Enforcement's characterization, though, depends on the remedy
sought, see infra notes 289-311 and accompanying text, and a clarification of rights' characteri-
zation also depends on the remedy sought in the absence of the declaratory action, see infra
note 296 and accompanying text.
The Wardle court contends that concurrent jurisdiction for benefits-due lawsuits man-
dates the statutory scheme, not the legal-equitable distinction. Wardle v. Central States, S.E.
& S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 828-29 (7th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1112
(1981). Even if all claim benefit actions were equitable, they would still need a separate section
since these actions are triable in both state and federal court. See Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, § 502(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1988) (providing concurrent juris-
diction in federal and state court for benefit claim lawsuits). See infra notes 217-32 and
accompanying text for the response to this disparagement.
171. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 19, at 323, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5107. "All such actions in federal or state courts are to be regarded as arising under the laws
of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under § 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947." Id
The court in Wardle contends that this legislative history merely means that the courts
should fashion a federal common law, not make such actions identical to LMRA actions.
Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829; see also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209-10 (1985)
(LMRA § 301 means courts are to fashion common law for collective bargaining agreements).
However, in concluding that the courts under ERISA are to fashion a federal common
law, the Supreme Court relies on other legislative history. It cites a senator's statement to that
effect. 120 CONG. Rc. S29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits) ("[A] body of Federal sub-
stantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations
under private welfare and pension plans."); see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 110 (1989); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985);
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983); H.R.
RIm. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649
(ERISA's fiduciary responsibility provisions "codifly] and make[] applicable to [ERISA] fidu-
ciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.").
In contrast, the Supreme Court treats the reference to LMRA § 301 as meaning that a
benefits-due lawsuit be treated as a federal question for preempting state law, see Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1987), or authorizing grafting of LMRA procedures onto
benefits-due lawsuits; see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987)
(adopting LMRA Avco rule for benefits-due lawsuits, indicating that quoted legislative history
cannot be "more specific reference to the Avco rule"); see also supra note 98.
172. See infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text.
173. Almost all of the district courts finding a right to a jury trial are located in two cir-
cuits.
The Second Circuit cases come primarily from New York, a state that permits jury trials
in ERISA actions. E.g., Resnick v. Resnick, 763 F. Supp. 760, 765-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (par-
ticipant sued for lump sum from pension plan); Smith v. Union Mut. Ins. Co., 90 Civ. 1888,
1990 WL 209456, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1990) (former employee sued for disability bene-
fits); Abbarno v. Carborundum Co., 682 F. Supp. 179, 181-82 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (participants
sued to recover severance pay from private company plan; damage action for nonpayment of
benefits and so legal although involving review under arbitrary and capricious rule); Paladino
v. Taxicab Indus. Pension Fund, 588 F. Supp. 37, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (participant sued for
benefit denial from union plan without suing under LMRA; involving the arbitrary and capri-
cious rule; permitting jury trial because these actions are legal in nature, arising out of contract
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The circuit courts have permitted jury trials for benefits-due law-
suits when other matters that require a jury trial have also been in-
volved.174 With respect to other types of litigation under ERISA, their
decisions have been mixed.175
between union, employers and trustees, with employee as third party beneficiary); Pollock v.
Castrovinci, 476 F. Supp. 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (former employee sued trustee for prohib-
ited transaction by terminated plan, treated as benefits-due lawsuit), aff'd, 622 F.2d 575 (2d
Cir. 1980); see Reeves v. Continental Equities Corp., 765 F. Supp. 469, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(judge uncertain whether case concerns breach of fiduciary without jury trial or damages for
nonpayment with jury trial; judge defers to gather evidence for jury determination); Sixty-Five
Sec. Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 583 F. Supp. 380, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (dicta);
Gehrhardt v. General Motors Corp., 434 F. Supp. 981, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (employee sued
employer for denied pension benefit; jury trial not questioned), aff'd, 581 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1978). See infra note 179 for New York state cases.
The Eleventh Circuit cases come primarily from Alabama, a state that permits jury trials
in ERISA actions. Eg., Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Lewis, 753 F. Supp. 345, 348 (N.D. Ala.
1990) (subrogation action for medical benefits); Rhodes v. Piggly Wiggly Ala. Distrib. Co., 741
F. Supp. 1542, 1545-46 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (employee sued for benefits due); Porter v. Mutual
Serv. Life Ins. Co., No. CV90-PT-700-S, 1990 WL 174716, at *3 (N.D. Ala. June 26, 1990)
(beneficiary sued for benefits due); Gangitano v. NN Investors Life Ins. Co., 733 F. Supp. 342,
343 (S.D. Fla. 1990). See infra note 185 for Alabama state cases.
Similar isolated opinions have come from the Third Circuit, Puz v. Bessemer Cement Co.,
700 F. Supp. 267, 268 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (retirees sued seeking entitlement to lifetime health
insurance benefits; major issue contractual involving factual ambiguities in plan provisions),
the Sixth Circuit, International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement
Workers v. Park-Ohio Indus., 661 F. Supp. 1281, 1310 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (employee sued plan
administrator for breach of fiduciary duties in terminating health benefits treated as benefits-
due lawsuit), aff'd, 876 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1989), the Seventh Circuit, Boesl v. Suburban Trust
& Say. Bank, 642 F. Supp. 1503, 1511 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (employee sued plan administrator for
wrongful denial of medical benefits), and the Tenth Circuit, Lawson v. Lapeka, Inc., 55 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 987 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 1991) (former employee sought additional
retirement benefits, jury trial not questioned).
174. E.g., Krause v. Dresser Indus., 910 F.2d 674, 676 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming ERISA
claim for lost benefits for wrongful termination in violation of Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988),
which permits legal or equitable relief, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1988)); Olitsky v. Spencer Gifts,
Inc., 842 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988).
175. The other ERISA actions primarily deal with fiduciary breaches, injunctions and other
equitable relief, and contribution refunds.
In actions under ERISA § 502(a)(2) by participant-beneficiaries and fiduciaries for fiduci-
ary breaches, typically violations of ERISA § 409(a), the federal courts generally deny jury
trials. E.g., Devine v. Combustion Eng'g, 760 F. Supp. 989, 994 (D. Conn. 1991) (participant
requested injunction to prevent breach of fiduciary duty in plan amendment); Goodman v. S &
A Restaurant Corp., 756 F. Supp. 966, 970 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (participant sued for breach of
fiduciary duty for failure to process application for medical benefits in timely manner); Diduck
v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, 737 F. Supp. 808, 810-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (employees sued
employer to make plan whole for breach of fiduciary duty; relief sought is equitable); Motor
Carriers Labor Advisory Council v. Trucking Management, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 701, 702 (E.D.
Pa. 1990) (employers sued trustees for breaches of fiduciary duty violating ERISA § 409);
Baker v. Universal Die Casting, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 416,418 (W.D. Ark. 1989) (former employ-
ees sued employer for wrongful termination of plan); Berlo v. McCoy, 710 F. Supp. 873, 874
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C. State Decisions
Because the majority of federal decisions, which exclusively follow a
(D.N.H. 1989) (participant sued trustees for breach of fiduciary duty in failing to credit inter-
est); Brock v. Group Legal Adm'rs, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Department
of Labor on behalf of participants sought restitution and injunction for breach of fiduciary
duty); Browning v. Grote Meat Co., 703 F. Supp. 790, 794-95 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (former em-
ployee sued plan administrator for violation of ERISA § 409 for failing to provide medical
insurance following termination); Trustees of Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund
v. Golden Nuggett, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1538, 1549 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (plan administrator sued
investment manager for fiduciary violations in permitting plan to sell discounted notes that
were prepaid in full); Dasler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 694 F. Supp. 624, 627 n.4 (D. Minn. 1988)
(plan administrators sued investment manager for breach of fiduciary duty); Smith v. ABS
Indus., 653 F. Supp. 94, 97-99 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (retirees sued employers for breaches of
fiduciary duties violating ERISA § 409); Bigger v. American Commercial Lines, Inc., 652 F.
Supp. 123, 128 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (participants sued plan administrators for breach of fiduciary
duty in connection with transfer of assets from first pension plan to second one being spun oft);
Unitis v. JFC Acquisition Co., 643 F. Supp. 454, 461 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (participants challenged
employer's decision to amend pension plan and terminate fund to recover excess funding as
breach of fiduciary duty; equitable); Burud v. Acme Elec. Co., 591 F. Supp. 238, 248 n.9 (D.
Alaska 1984) (employee sued to undo certain transactions constituting fiduciary breaches);
Kahnke v. Herter, 579 F. Supp. 1524, 1526-28 (D. Minn. 1984) (participants sued plan admin-
istrators for breaches of fiduciary duty violating ERISA § 409).
However, some federal courts have permitted jury trials in ERISA actions involving fidu-
ciary breaches. E.g., Sommers Drug Stores Employee Profit-Sharing Trust v. Corrigan, 883
F.2d 345, 350-53 (5th Cir. 1989) (reviewing fiduciary responsibility jury instructions); Utilcorp
United Inc. v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 741 F. Supp. 1363, 1366-67 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (employer
sued investment manager for fiduciary breaches; involving legal issues and thus requiring jury
trial).
In actions under ERISA § 502(a)(3), for injunctions and other equitable relief to prevent
fiduciary breaches or enforce ERISA's statutory provisions, courts deny jury trials due to the
express reference to equity. E.g., Bair v. General Motors Corp., 895 F.2d 1094, 1097 (6th Cir.
1990) (in statement in plan sought by participant-beneficiary as well as benefits due); Cox v.
Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 392-93 (3d Cir. 1988) (remedy for retaliatory discharge
for exercising ERISA rights under ERISA § 510, sought by participant-beneficiary as well as
benefits due), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 47 (1990); Crews v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas
Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 332, 338 (6th Cir. 1986) (employer sought refund of mistaken contri-
bution under ERISA § 403(c); restitution is equitable remedy); Turner v. CF & I Steel Corp.,
770 F.2d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1985) (dicta), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); Katsaros v. Cody,
744 F.2d 270, 278-79 (2d Cir.) (trustee removal and plan restitution sought by participant-
beneficiaries), cert denied sub nom. Cody v. Donovan, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); Haberern v.
Kaupp Vascular Surgeons, Ltd., No. Civ. A. 88-1853, 1989 WL 71474, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June
26, 1989) (employee sued plan administrator for accounting relating to various breaches of
fiduciary duty); Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (former
employee sued for retaliatory discharge due to exercise of ERISA rights in violation of ERISA
§ 510; court held equitable action); Kann v. Keystone Resources, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1084,
1089 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (participant sued for wrongful withholding of termination benefit from
profit-sharing plan).
But some federal courts have permitted jury trials in ERISA actions involving the alleg-
edly equitable relief. E.g., Garcia v. Danbury Hosp. Corp., No. Civ. B-90-232, 1991 WL
23537, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 9, 1991) (former employee sued for retaliatory discharge); Weber
v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 751 F. Supp. 21, 25 (D. Conn. 1990) (retaliatory discharge under ERISA
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trust approach to employee benefit programs, have concluded generally
that ERISA did not grant an implied right to a jury trial, state courts
focus on their own constitutions and statutes to resolve whether they try
the benefits-due lawsuit by jury.
Most state constitutional provisions relating to the right to a jury
trial in civil actions only preserve it. 176 State courts have held that their
constitutions only protect the right to a jury trial available under the
common law and statutes current in the colony, territory or state
(although a few use English law) at the time of the adoption of the partic-
ular state of its constitution. 177 Under a constitutional provision of this
§ 510 involves fact questions; requiring jury trial); Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils, Inc., 739
F. Supp. 882, 885-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same).
The circuit courts also generally deny jury trials for recovery of unpaid contributions
under ERISA § 502(a)(3). E.g., Sheet Metal Workers Local 19 v. Keystone Heating & Air
Conditioning, 934 F.2d 35, 39-40 (3d Cir. 1991) (jury trial was error).
Some circuit courts have permitted jury trials in ERISA actions involving unpaid contri-
butions. E.g., May v. Interstate Moving & Storage, 739 F.2d 521, 523 (10th Cir. 1984) (ambi-
guity in collective bargaining agreement permits jury trial).
176. Thirty-five state constitutions contain language stating that the right to a jury trial
shall remain "inviolate." ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11; ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 23; ARK. CONST.
art. 2, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16; CONN. CoNsT. art. 1, § 19; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22; GA.
CONST. art. I, § 1, 1 XI; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; ILL. CONsr. art. I, § 13; IND. CONST. art.
1, § 20 (for civil cases); IOWA CONsT. art. I, § 9; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5; Ky. CoNsr.
Bill of Rights, § 7; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4; Mss. CONST. art. 3, § 31; Mo. CONST. art. I,
§ 22(a); MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 26; NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 6; NEv. CONST. art. 1, § 3; N.J.
CONST. art. I, 9; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12; N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 25; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19; OR.
CONST. art. I, § 17; PA. CONsT. art. I, § 6; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14;
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 6; TENN. CONsT. art. I, § 6; TEx. CoNsT. art. I, § 15; WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 21; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 5.
Five state constitutions "preserve" the right. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16 (civil cases);
HAw. CONST. art. I, § 13; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights art. 23; W. VA. CONST. art. III,
§ 13; see MICH. CONST. art. I, § 14 (shall remain). Four state constitutions provide the right
except as heretofore otherwise stated. ME. CONsT. art. I, § 20 (civil cases); MASS. CONST. pt.
1, art. XV; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 20; see DEL. CONST. art. I, § 4 (granted as heretofore).
Two state constitutions hold the right sacred. VT. CONST. cl. I, art. 12; VA. CONST. art.
I, § 11 (civil cases).
Utah's constitutional provision is ambiguous as mentioning only capital cases. UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 10 (inviolate); see Ronan E. Degnan, Right to Civil Jury Trial in Utah: Consti-
tution and Statute, 8 UTAH L. REv. 97, 101 (1963). On the basis of state constitutional con-
vention history, Utah's highest court has held it covers civil suits. International Harvester
Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Trailer & Implement Inc., 626 P.2d 418, 419 (Utah 1981).
Three states have no constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases. See Firelock, Inc. v.
District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1097 (Colo. 1989); Duplantis v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Ins. Corp., 342 So. 2d 1142, 1143-44 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (jury trial by statute only, LA. CODE
CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1731 (West 1990)); Farrell v. Hursh Agency, Inc., 713 P.2d 1174, 1181
(Wyo. 1986); see also James, supra note 96, at 1022 n.4 (noting, as of 1935, Colorado and
Louisiana had no constitutional guarantee of jury trial in civil actions).
177. Eighteen states that have so decided have had only one constitution so there is no
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type, the existence of a right to a jury trial depends on whether the court
problem concerning which constitution. Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 580 n.7
(Alaska 1973) (territorial law as looks to Seventh Amendment, U.S. CoNST. amend. VII);
Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 410 P.2d 479, 482 (Ariz. 1966) (1911; territorial law); Harada v.
Burns, 445 P.2d 376, 380 n.1 (Haw. 1968) (territorial law as looks to Seventh Amendment);
Sheets v. Agro-West, Inc., 664 P.2d 787, 791 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (1889; territorial law);
State v. Pinkerton, 340 P.2d 393, 395 (Kan. 1959) (1859; territorial law as finds territorial
statute); North School Congregate Housing v. Merrithew, 558 A.2d 1189, 1190 (Me. 1989)
(1820; Massachusetts law); Freeman v. Wood, 401 N.E.2d 108, 109-10 (Mass. 1980) (1780;
English and provincial law); Breinhorst v. Beckman, 35 N.W.2d 719, 734 (Minn. 1949) (1858;
territorial law); Hudson v. City of Las Vegas, 409 P.2d 245, 246-47 (Nev. 1965) (1864; territo-
rial law as looks to U.S. Constitution); Bliss v. Greenwood, 315 P.2d 223, 226 (N.M. 1957)
(1911; territorial law); Smith v. Kunert, 115 N.W. 76, 77 (N.D. 1907) (1889; territorial law);
Keeter v. State, 198 P. 866, 869 (Okla. 1921) (1907; territorial law); In re Idleman's Commit-
ment, 27 P.2d 305, 310 (Or. 1933) (1859; territorial law as finds territorial statute); Briggs
Drive, Inc. v. Moorehead, 239 A.2d 186, 187 (R.I. 1968) (1843; state law); Shaw v. Shaw, 133
N.W. 292, 292-93 (S.D. 1911) (territorial law as looks to Seventh Amendment); Zions First
Nat'l Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irrigation, Inc., 795 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1990) (1896; territo-
rial law); Firchau v. Gaskill, 558 P.2d 194, 197 (Wash. 1978) (1889; territorial law as finds
territorial statute); Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 102 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Wis. 1960) (1848; terri-
torial law as looks to Seventh Amendment).
Of the states with multiple constitutions, thirteen provide for the most recently passed
constitution, meaning that a statute granting the right to a jury trial then in effect is also
protected. Exparte W & H Mach. & Tool Co., 283 So. 2d 173, 175-76 (Ala. 1973) (1901; state
law); State v. Johnson, 26 Ark. 281, 292 (Ark. 1870) (naming present constitution; now 1874;
state law); Gentile v. Altermatt, 363 A.2d 1, 17 (Conn. 1975) (naming existing of 1965); Doris
v. McFarland, 156 A. 52, 57 (Conn. 1931) (state law as uses own decision); Cahill v. State, 411
A.2d 317, 322 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980) (naming last of 1897 to protect jury trial under 1792
statute; state law), rev'd on other grounds, 443 A.2d 497 (Del. 1982); State Line Elevator, Inc.
v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 526 N.E.2d 753, 754 (Ind. 1988) (1852; state law as eschews
Seventh Amendment); State Conservation Dep't v. Brown, 55 N.W.2d 859, 860-61 (Mich.
1952) (naming 1908, now 1964; state law as refers to state statutes); Vannoy v. Swift & Co.,
201 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Mo. 1947) (naming 1875, now 1945; state law as looks to pre-constitu-
tion state cases); State v. Hauser, 288 N.W. 518, 520 (Neb. 1939) (constitution, presumedly
current one of 1875; state law as refers to state statutes); Stizza v. Essex County Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, 40 A.2d 567, 569 (N.J. 1945) (naming 1844, now 1947; state law);
Daley v. Kennet, 78 A. 123, 124-25 (N.H. 1910) (naming 1784; state law as looks to this
jurisdiction); White v. White, 196 S.W. 508, 517 (Tex. 1917) (naming 1876; state law); Demp-
sey v. Holiis, 75 A.2d 662, 663 (Vt. 1950) (naming 1793; state law); Hickman v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 4 S.E. 654, 655-56 (W. Va. 1887) (1880 when that provision of 1872 constitution was
last amended; state law), overruled on other grounds by Richmond v. Henderson, 37 S.E. 653,
657 (W. Va. 1900).
Of those states with multiple constitutions, eleven provide for the first constitution. Peo-
ple v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 286-87, 231 P.2d 832, 835 (1951) (1850;
English law); State v. Webb, 335 So. 2d 826, 828 (Fla. 1976) (1845); Dudley v. Harrison,
McCready & Co., 173 So. 820, 825 (Fla. 1937) (territorial law as looks to Seventh Amend-
ment); Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 305 N.W.2d 724, 726-28 (Iowa 1981) (1846;
territorial law as looks to Seventh Amendment); People v. Kelly, 179 N.E. 898, 902 (Il1. 1931)
(1818; territorial law); Johnson v. Holbrook, 302 S.W.2d 608, 611 (Ky. 1957) (1792; territorial
law as looks to Seventh Amendment); Houston v. Lloyd's Consumer Acceptance Corp., 215
A.2d 192, 198-99 (Md. 1965) (1776); Commonwealth v. Warren, 105 A.2d 488, 491 (Md. App.
Ct. 1954) (provincial law); In re C.L.A. & J.A., 685 P.2d 931, 933-34 (Mont. 1984) (1889;
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views the employee benefit program as a contract, legal in nature, or as a
trust, equitable in nature. State courts in Nevada, 7 ' New York,17 9 Vir-
ginia 8 0 and Wisconsin'' have used the contractual approach to em-
ployee benefit programs to find the right to a jury trial in a benefits-due
lawsuit. A court in Florida, using the trust approach, has found no right
to a jury trial.
18 2
In addition to this type of constitutional provision, seven states have
constitutional or statutory provisions granting jury trials in equity mat-
ters under certain conditions, usually for fact questions.8 3 Under provi-
territorial law as uses territorial statute); Mason v. State, 50 N.E. 6, 9 (Ohio 1898) (1802;
territorial law); Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. 89, 96 (1862) (1776; English and colonial
law); Patten v. State, 426 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tenn. 1968) (1796; North Carolina law), cert
denied, 400 U.S. 844 (1970); Newberry v. Commonwealth, 66 S.E.2d 841, 843 (Va. 1951)
(criminal jury under English and colonial law in 1776 under similar constitutional provision);
Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 105 S.E. 141, 148 (Va. 1920) (1776).
Of those states with multiple constitutions, four provide for some intermediate constitu-
tion. Cawthon v. Douglas Co., 286 S.E.2d 30, 32-34 (Ga. 1982) (naming 1798 as first such
provision; but Georgia constitutions of 1777 and 1789 also had provision; see 2 FRANCIS
THORP, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND ORGANIC
LAWS 785, 789 (1909) (state law); Moot v. Moot, 108 N.E. 424, 425 (N.Y. 1915) (1846; consti-
tution in effect when constitutional provision referring to earlier constitution adopted, thereby
cutting off effect of Wynehammer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 425-27 (Ct. App. 1856) (specifying
current constitution); state law)); North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont, 286 S.E.2d 89, 93-95
(N.C. 1982) (1868 constitution since 1979 constitution merely corrected its outdated language
and arrangement; state law); Pelfrey v. Bank of Greer, 244 S.E.2d 315, 316 (S.C. 1978) (1868
constitution, unwittingly overruling State v. Gibbes, 95 S.E. 346, 347-48 (S.C. 1918) (first
constitution of 1776 since all since then have such provision; state law)).
Mississippi's highest court has stated the constitution provides for an unspecified ancient
time. Walters v. Blackledge, 71 So. 2d 433, 445 (Miss. 1954) (presumedly English).
178. See Herbst v. Humana Health Ins., 781 P.2d 762, 763 (Nev. 1989) (right to jury trial
not questioned; medical plan).
179. Walker v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 544 N.Y.S.2d 958, 959-60 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (fol-
lowing Paladino v. Taxicab Indus. Pension Fund, 588 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); disabil-
ity plan); Fuller v. INA Life Ins. Co., 533 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217-18 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (same;
accidental death plan).
180. See Nicely v. Bank of Va. Trust Co., 277 S.E.2d 209, 210 (Va. 1981) (jury trial not
questioned; profit-sharing plan).
181. Evans v. W.E.A. Ins. Trust, 361 N.W.2d 630, 638 (Wis. 1985) (benefits-due lawsuit is
one for money damages with right to jury trial; health plan).
182. Pfeiffer v. Roux Lab., Inc., 547 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (benefits-
due lawsuit is equitable, not contractual, requires no jury; disability plan).
183. Prior to 1950, of the thirteen states that had experimented with a right to jury trial in
equity actions, only four have retained it. See M.T. Van Hecke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases,
31 N.C. L. REv. 157, 158 (1953). Since 1845, Texas has provided it broadly by constitution.
TEx. CONST. art. V, § 10 (all causes in state district courts); State v. Credit Bureau of Laredo,
Inc., 530 S.W.2d 288, 292-93 (Tex. 1975) (constitutional provision extends jury trial to all
actions and suits in law or equity). North Carolina since 1873 provides a right to jury trial for
fact questions in equity by an interpretation of its constitution. See Lee v. Pearce, 68 N.C. 76,
82 (1873) (interpreting 1868 constitution). Georgia since 1792 and Tennessee since 1846 pro-
vide it by statute for questions of fact. GA. CODE ANN. § 23-3-66 (Harrison 1991); TENN.
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sions of this type, courts in*Arizona, 184 Alabama,"'5 Georgia, 186 North
Carolina, 187 Tennessee 18 and Texas"8 9 have found a right to a jury trial
in a benefits-due lawsuit. The remaining state permitting jury trials in
some equity matters, Louisiana, denies a jury trial for benefits-due law-
suits.190 That state's statute denies a jury trial if it is denied by federal
law 91 and Louisiana courts interpreted the Wardle v. Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund 192 decision as invoking that
CODE ANN. § 21-1-103 (1980 & Supp. 1990). See generally James A. Gardner, Anachronism
of Modern Equity-Discretion of the Chancellor in the Use of the Jury, 8 MERCER L. Rnv. 225
(1957) (explaining development of equity juries in Georgia); Frank C. Ingraham, Note, Jury
Trial in Chancery Court in Tennessee, 7 VAND. L. REv. 393 (1954) (same; Tennessee).
Since 1950, three additional states have adopted jury trials for equity proceedings. Ala-
bama adopted it by decision if money damages are sought. See Whitman v. Mashburn, 238 So.
2d 709, 715 (Ala. 1970) (bill in equity seeking accounting and money damages entitled to jury
trial); Frank W. Donaldson & J. Michael Walls, Merger of Law and Equity in Alabama--Some
Considerations, 33 ALA. LAW. 134, 143-44 (1972). Arizona by decision requires fact issues in
equitable cases to be tried by jury. See Haynie v. Taylor, 213 P.2d 684, 689-90 (Ariz. 1950).
Louisiana requires jury trials in all civil cases with enumerated exceptions, including probate,
injunctive, divorce and federal admiralty matters and where denied by law, LA. CODE CIV.
PRoc. ANN. arts. 1731, 1732 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991), including federal law, see Cramer v.
Association Life Ins. Co., 569 So. 2d 533, 541 (La. 1990) (courts deny jury trial under federal
law for ERISA claims), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1391 (1991).
184. See Elgin v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 786 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1989) (refusing to render on reformed cause of action injury trial since defendant then could
have removed to federal court to avoid jury; health plan).
185. E.g., Haywood v. Russell Corp., 584 So. 2d 1291, 1298 (Ala. 1991) (following Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. Lewis, 753 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Ala. 1990); disability plan); Ex parte
Ward, 448 So. 2d 349, 351-52 (Ala. 1984) (ERISA plan contractual so jury trial; health plan);
see Hoffman v. Chandler, 431 So. 2d 499, 500 (Ala. 1983) (jury trial not questioned; medical
plan).
186. See Anderson v. Chatham, 379 S.E.2d 793, 797 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (jury trial not
questioned; retirement plan); TRW, Inc. v. Ebersole, 341 S.E.2d 267, 268 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
(remand for jury trial; disability plan).
187. Overcash v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 381 S.E.2d 330, 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989)
(medical plan).
188. See Campbell v. Precision Rubber Prods. Corp., 737 S.W.2d 283, 283 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1987) (employee lawsuit to reinstate participation in health plan; chancellor decided without
jury as waived).
189. Burghart v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 806 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)
(entitled to jury trial for ERISA action under long-term disability plan); see Petrolite Corp. v.
Barnhouse, 812 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (jury trial not questioned; retirement plan);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Forbau, 808 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (same; medical plan);
Felts v. Graphic Arts Employee Benefit Trust, 680 S.W.2d 891, 892-93 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(same; health plan).
190. Cramer v. Association Life Ins. Co., 569 So. 2d 533, 534 (La. 1990), cert. denied, 11
S. Ct. 1391 (1991).
191. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1732(7) (West 1990 & Supp. 1991).
192. 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981).
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limitation. 193
IV. THE PROPER SOLUTION
Resolution of whether there is a right to a jury trial in benefits-due
cases depends on two investigations. Both are essentially the same under
either the federal system or the state systems. Since ERISA contains no
express provision granting a jury trial for benefits-due lawsuits, did Con-
gress impliedly intend for courts to try such lawsuits by jury?'9 4 If not,
are benefits-due lawsuits analogous to a type of action that requires a jury
trial under some constitution or statute?
195
A. Implied Congressional Intent
Examination of ERISA's legislative history reveals four items of an
implied intent by Congress to grant rights to a jury trial for benefits-due
lawsuits. First, Congress expressed an intention not only to preserve pre-
ERISA state remedies, but to expand them.196 Those remedies were con-
tractual and generally tried by jury. 197 Second, the statutory scheme pro-
vided for a contractual approach to employee benefit programs and
Congress recognized that participant-beneficiary rights under these pro-
grams arise contractually and hence carry a right to a jury trial. 9 '
Third, Congress desired to increase legal remedies for participant-benefi-
ciaries suing for benefits due. 99 Legal remedies mean a jury trial.
Lastly, Congress, rather than work out a complete set of new ERISA
procedures, incorporated LMRA procedures into ERISA actions, which
treat employee benefit programs as contracts with a right to a jury
trial.
2 °°
1. Preservation of state remedies
When Congress passed ERISA, it desired to expand, not constrict,
the remedies already available under state law for benefits-due lawsuits.
Committee reports in both houses clearly express this goal:
The intent of the Committee [in providing the benefits-due law-
suit] is to provide the full range of legal and equitable remedies
193. Cramer, 569 So. 2d at 534 (no right to jury trial for ERISA claims as denied under
federal law).
194. See infra notes 199-271 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 272-311 and accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 201-16 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 217-32 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 233-41 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 242-71 and accompanying text.
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available in both state and federal courts to remove jurisdic-
tional and procedural obstacles which in the past appear to
have hampered effective enforcement of fiduciary responsibili-
ties under state law for recovery of benefits due to
participants.20'
ERISA was intended to improve the remedies already available under
state law.
The early state approaches to handling benefits-due lawsuits re-
volved around misconceptions concerning whether the employee benefit
program was a contract or a trust.2 ' 2 The problem of whether benefits-
due lawsuits entail jury trials arose because most employee benefit pro-
grams were dual in nature, possessing a contractual plan instrument set-
ting forth the participation requirements and benefits provided as well as
a trust instrument setting forth the funding mechanism. 20 3 Some plans
are unfunded and thus have no trust element.2° Unfortunately, state
courts, rather than recognize this dual nature, focused only on one as-
pect. Most state courts finally settled on the contract approach,205 but a
few settled on the trust approach2 6 as did some federal courts for
LMRA actions.20 7 The contractual approach was so predominant that
the United States Supreme Court has described pre-ERISA employee
benefit law as contractual in nature.
208
201. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 171, at 17, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4655; S.
REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871.
The jurisdictional obstacles concerned such things as legal rules against suing nonresident
trusts. See, eg., Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 310-11 (6th Cir. 1974). Even benefits-due
lawsuits under LMRA met jurisdictional hurdles, such as insufficient violations under LMRA
§ 301. See, e.g., Bass v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local No. 582, 630 F.2d 1058,
1066-67 (5th Cir. 1980). See infra notes 279-81 for various procedural obstacles.
202. See, eg., Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 COLUM. L.
REv. 909, 916-24 (1970) (explaining that participant-beneficiaries used contract law to recover
denied benefits and used trust law supplementally to prevent mishandling of funds before par-
ticipant-beneficiaries had right to draw on those funds).
203. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
204. E.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105 (1989) (severance pay
plan from employer's general assets).
Employers pay benefits for unfunded plans solely from employer assets. Starting in 1921,
income tax law required tax-sheltered plans to have trusts, Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136,
§ 219(f), 42 Stat. 227, 247, and in 1947 LMRA required multi-employer plans to have trusts,
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1988).
205. See infra note 208, 280.
206. See infra note 281.
207. See supra note 85 and infra note 264 and accompanying text.
208. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 112; see also McKinnon v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 691 F. Supp.
1314, 1315 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (inconsistent with ERISA's goals for circuit courts to claim
ERISA took away right to jury trial participant-beneficiaries had under pre-ERISA law),
aff'd, 874 F.2d 820 (11th Cir. 1989).
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As the legal rules under contract law and trust law are basically the
same,20 9 the significance of the different approaches lies in whether the
participant-beneficiary has a right to a jury trial. Some states grant a
right to a jury trial only for cases at law, namely contracts.210 For those
states granting a right to a jury trial for cases in equity, namely trusts,
21'
the distinction is of little import. Since most states viewed employee ben-
efit plans as contractual, most granted the right to jury trial for benefits-
due lawsuits.2 12 Only a few viewed the matter under trust law and so
denied jury trials.2 13
209. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
212. Since the state theory was that employee benefit programs were contracts, they permit-
ted a jury trial without questioning it. E.g., Wayte v. Rollins Int'l, 169 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9, 215
Cal. Rptr. 59, 63 (1985) (pre-ERISA plan contractual so jury trial; employee sued plan for
medical benefit); Bird v. Connecticut Power Co., 133 A.2d 894, 894 (Conn. 1957) (former
employee sued for pension payment from pension plan); Cotton v. Edward Don & Co., 245 So.
2d 881, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (former employee sued employer for vested share in
profit-sharing plan); General Electric Co. v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)
(former employee sued employer for disability benefit from pension plan); Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. Williams, 47 N.W.2d 607, 608 (Mich. 1951) (employer sued employee to recover
amount wrongfully paid under health and accident insurance plan); Rakness v. Swift & Co.,
175 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Minn. 1970) (employee sued employer for denied disability benefit from
retirement plan); Blacik v. Canco Division-American Can Co., 156 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Minn.
1968) (former employee sued employer for additional retirement benefit and vacation pay);
Stopford v. Boonton Molding Co., 265 A.2d 657, 659 (N.J. 1970) (retiree sued employer for
anticipatory breach of vested contractual right to pension from pension plan); Hindle v. Morri-
sion Steel Co., 223 A.2d 193, 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966) (former employee sued
employer to recover contractual rights in retirement fund); Gearns v. Commercial Cable Co.,
42 N.Y.S.2d 81, 82 (App. Div. 1943) (employee sued employer for monthly payment due
under retirement plan), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 105 (1944); Going v. Southern Mills' Employees'
Trust, 281 P.2d 762, 762 (Okla. 1955) (employee sued trust to compel payment of share in
profit-sharing plan); Amicone v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 431 P.2d 130, 130 (Utah 1967)
(employee sued employer for disability benefits from pension plan).
North Carolina and Texas courts, which permit jury trials also in equity, see supra note
183, also followed the contractual approach to jury trials. E.g., Bradlye v. Pritchard, 118
S.E.2d 422, 425 (N.C. 1961) (former employee sued trustee for cash value of policy on life);
Neuhofi Bros. Packers Management Corp. v. Wilson, 453 S.W.2d 472,472 (Tex. 1970) (former
employee sued trustee for benefit due from profit-sharing plan); Hexter v. Powell, 475 S.W.2d
857, 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (former employee sued trustees for benefit from terminated
pension plan); Bruner v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 455 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)
(former employee sued trustee for disability benefits from retirement plan); Long v. Southwest-
ern Bell Tel. Co., 442 S.W.2d 462,463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (widow sued employer for death
benefit under employee benefit plan).
213. Those courts using the theory that employee benefit programs were trusts permitted
trials before the judge without questioning it. E.g., Kennet v. United Mine Workers, 183 F.
Supp. 315, 316 (D.D.C. 1960) (tried without jury; retiree suing for benefit termination from
multi-employer plan); Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 346, 348 (D.D.C. 1958) (judge weighed
evidence for former employee suing for pension benefit from multi-employer plan); Hobbs v.
Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282, 284 (D.D.C. 1958) (same); Ex parte Garner, 190 So. 2d 544, 546
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:361
When Congress passes new legislation to solve a problem, courts
presume it considered prior case law relating to the problem.214 The con-
gressional reference to increasing the remedies of benefits-due lawsuits in
state court by removing jurisdictional hurdles acknowledges that state
courts tried these cases under a contract theory with a jury trial.2 15 Con-
gress therefore intended ERISA to expand the right to a jury trial
granted by the states in the pre-ERISA benefits-due lawsuit. The drastic
curtailment of this right engineered by the court in Wardle v. Central
States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund 21 6 violates this con-
gressional directive.
2. Statutory scheme
ERISA specifically acknowledges the dual nature of employee bene-
fit plans through a contractual part and a separate trust part.21 7 ERISA
clearly delineates one of the two instruments as the one governing opera-
tions, 218 and names the plan fiduciary separate from the trust instru-
(Ala. 1966) (former employee sued trustee for benefit from profit-sharing plan; case transferred
from law to equity; presumed nonjury trial as before Alabama required jury trial in equity; see
supra note 183); Barlow v. Roche, 161 A.2d 58, 63 (D.C. 1960) (tried in equity even though
brought as action at law for monies due and owing under multi-employer health plan); Forrish
v. Kennedy, 105 A.2d 67, 68 (Pa. 1954) (employee sued trustees for retirement pension from
multi-employer plan in equity). But see Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 297 F. Supp. 485,
489 (D. Minn. 1969) (former employees' suit for vested benefit upon profit-sharing plan termi-
nation has right to jury trial under trust law's legal remedy).
214. E.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501
(1986); District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 453-54 (1941); Blake v. McKim, 103
U.S. 336, 339 (1880); 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 50.01
(4th ed. 1984); see Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 759 (1988) (Congress
presumed to know about labor union practices when passing labor laws).
215. See infra note 229 and accompanying text for congressional reference to pre-ERISA
pension law as contractual.
216. 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981).
217. See 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(o)(3)(xviii)(a) (1991) (make available to participants for de-
termination letter "updated copy of the plan and the related trust agreement (if any)"); 29
C.F.R. § 2520.104b-l(b)(3) (1991) (make available to participants during reasonable times
plan documents consisting of "plan description, latest annual report, and the bargaining agree-
ment, trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which the plan is established or
operated.").
218. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1988)
("Every employee benefit plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a... plan
instrument" that shall provide for the operation and administration of the plan); see id.
§§ 1015, 2003(a), 26 U.S.C. §§ 414(g)(1), 4975(d)()(C); id. §§ 3, 104, 405, 408, 414, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1002(16)(A)(i), 1024(a)(1)(B), (2), (4), (6), 1105(c)(1), 1108(b)(8)(C), 11 14(b)(2) (all refer-
ring to instrument under which benefit program is established, maintained or operated); see
also id. § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (indicating that instruments of benefit program are
plural).
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ment.219 ERISA also clearly delineates one of the two instruments as
governing the program's assets.22° So ERISA recognizes that a part of
the employee benefit plan is contractual in nature.
Clever arguments cannot avoid that contractual nature, and hence
possible jury trials, by placing participation requirements in the trust in-
strument. ERISA merely defines the plan instrument, the contract, as
that portion of the employee benefit program including participation pro-
visions, regardless of the label on the actual instrument.
Congress made clear that employee benefit programs did not consist
solely of a trust document governed by trust law.221 Congressional re-
ports indicate that trust law alone was inadequate to safeguard partici-
pant-beneficiaries' rights2 22 and that the LMRA standards, namely the
arbitrary and capricious review standard, were not good enough for
ERISA.223 Furthermore, courts were not to apply just pre-ERISA law.
Instead, Congress directed them to take into consideration the special
differences between employee benefit trusts and traditional testamentary
trusts.224 These differences should at least take into account that: (1) the
employer has a continuing economic interest in the program to reduce its
costs since the employer is ultimately liable for its benefits and costs; (2)
the employee's interest in the program represents the employee's deferred
compensation; and (3) the plan administrator's review process is geared
to justify its own prior determination in a nonneutral fashion.225 Thus,
219. Id. § 403,29 U.S.C. § 1103(a); see also S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4978 n.2 (trust sometimes means plan whether or not in trust
form).
220. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988)
("Mrustee shall be... named in the trust instrument" and shall have authority to manage and
control the plan's assets.); see also id §§ 403, 422, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a), 1105(a)(1), (c)(5),
1403(b)(1) (all referring to trust instrument); id § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (indicating
that instruments of benefit program are plural); Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 26
U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(2), 501(c)(22)(D) (1988) (referring to employee benefit program's trust
instrument).
221. See supra notes 217-20, infra note 229 and accompanying text for congressional recog-
nition of non-trust employee benefit program documents, some governed by contract law.
222. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 171, at 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4650
("Conventional trust law often is insufficient to adequately protect the interests of plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries.").
223. Id. at 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4642 ("[LMRA] is not intended to estab-
lish nor does it provide standards for the preservation of vested benefits, funding adequacy,
security of investment, or fiduciary conduct.").
224. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 19, at 302, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5083 ("The conferees expect that the courts will interpret this prudent man rule (and the other
fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of employee benefit
plans.").
225. See Flint, supra note 25, at 173; Langbein, supra note 28, at 211-12.
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Congress recognized that employee benefit programs were far more than
just trusts.
Congress provided that the rights of the participant-beneficiary arise
in the contractual plan instrument relating to the establishment of the
benefit program.226 These rights, under the deferred wage theory of pre-
ERISA law, were contractual.227 They represented an exchange of the
promise of deferred wages, the benefits, for the consideration of present
228services. Congress recognized these rights as contractual in its com-
mittee reports:
In almost every instance, participants lose their benefits not be-
cause of some violation of federal law, but rather because of the
manner in which the plan is executed with respect to its con-
tractual requirements of vesting or funding.
229
Moreover, these congressional committee reports specifically acknowl-
edge that ERISA adopted the deferred wage theory for participant-bene-
ficiary rights under employee benefit plans: "[ERISA] presumes that
promised pension benefits are in the form of a conditional deferred
wage."'230 Thus the document that creates the rights of the participant-
beneficiaries, the one that establishes the plan, is contractual in nature
under the congressional explanation. Moreover, it is under that plan
document that participant-beneficiaries sue in a benefits-due lawsuit,231
not under the trust instrument. The trust's only involvement in the bene-
fits-due lawsuit is that it is contractually obligated to satisfy the partici-
pant-beneficiary's judgment.232 Congress thus expected courts to enforce
these contractual rights through the benefits-due lawsuit under contract
law, which generally entails a right to a jury trial.
226. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502, 29 U.s.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988) (only reference to enforceable rights of participant-beneficiary as arising
under terms of plan instrument).
227. See infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text for congressional recognition of the
deferred wage theory giving rise to contractual rights.
228. See Comment, Consideration for the Employer's Promise of a Voluntary Pension Plan,
23 U. CHI. L. REv. 96, 99-103 (1955) (explaining contract theory of employee benefit plans
with consideration in either longevity of service or in present services for deferred wages).
229. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 171, at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4643; S.
REP. No. 127, supra note 201, at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4841-42.
230. H.R. RE. No. 533, supra note 171, at 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4651.
231. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988) ("li"]o recover benefits due [the participant-beneficiary] under the terms
of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan.").
232. See supra note 144 for the legal remedy of the participant-beneficiary against the
trustee.
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3. The increase in legal remedies
Another strand of legislative history indicates that Congress in-
tended the benefits-due lawsuit to provide the full range of legal remedies
available to participant-beneficiaries. 33 The word "legal" in the legisla-
tive history is a term of art that means the right to a jury trial.234 The
Wardle interpretation of limiting the benefits-due lawsuit to the ex-
tremely narrow trust legal remedy2 35 violates this congressional directive.
Wardle fails to provide that full range, which certainly includes the con-
tractual remedies associated with the contractual nature of employee
benefit plans recognized by Congress. The Stamps interpretation, in con-
trast, provides that full range of legal remedies.236
Under the congressional directive, courts are to treat benefits-due
lawsuits as contractual, providing the full range of legal remedies as dic-
tated by contract law.237 ERISA contains much language about trust
law,238 however, it is always in connection with fiduciary responsibili-
ties.239 Contract law ordinarily provides a low standard of behavior.2'
ERISA merely requires the higher altruistic standard of fiduciary behav-
ior from the parties to the employee benefit program, namely the sponsor
and the plan administrator.24 Congress's efforts to raise the standard of
fiduciary behavior should not be construed as an intent to deprive the
participant-beneficiaries of their right to a jury trial in obtaining money
damages for benefit denials.
4. Adoption of LMRA procedures
A fourth strand of legislative history indicates that courts should
apply LMRA procedures to ERISA actions that mandate a right to a
jury trial. The conference committee report on ERISA states that:
233. See supra note 201 and accompanying text for the portion of the congressional com-
mittee reports supporting the use of legal remedies.
234. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978) (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988))).
235. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 28, at 209-11.
239. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 533,
supra note 171, at 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4649 (ERISA "codifies and makes
applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of
trusts."); S. REP. No. 127, supra note 201, at 29, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4865
(same).
240. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 829-32 (1983) (explaining
that contract law does not go beyond morals of marketplace, while fiduciary law is altruistic).
241. See supra notes 239-40 for congressional intention to incorporate into ERISA fiduci-
ary law and explanation that fiduciary law is altruistic.
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[S]uits to enforce benefit rights under the plan or to recover
benefits under the plan which do not involve application of
[ERISA's] provisions . . . may be brought ... also in State
courts .... All such actions in Federal or State courts are to be
regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in simi-
lar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947.12
Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., then chairman of the Senate Commit-
tee on Labor and Public Welfare,2 43 co-sponsor of the original draft of
the ERISA legislation 2' and floor manager of the bill,245 explained the
legislation similarly.24 The United States Supreme Court stated explic-
itly that this legislative history could not be a "more specific reference"
to LMRA procedural rules.2 47 Consequently, the Supreme Court has
grafted the preemption removal procedures of LMRA onto ERISA ac-
tions.248 Thus, in handling benefits-due lawsuits in the absence of express
ERISA provisions concerning procedural matters, courts should examine
the corresponding LMRA practice.
With respect to the right to a jury trial, some courts have tried to
obfuscate the true LMRA practice. In Wardle, for example, the court
disparaged this legislative history as indicative of another matter249 and
cited the only court cases involving LMRA that denied the right to a jury
trial for benefits-due lawsuits250 for another proposition.25 I The reason is
clear. If courts examined that practice, they would conclude Wardle's
denial of the right to a jury trial is erroneous. In Stamps the court sug-
gested the correct analysis, but failed to explain it fully.
2 2
242. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 19, at 76-77, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5107.
243. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. XCII.
244. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Theodore P. Manno, ERISA Preemption and the McCarron-Ferguson Act: The
Need for CongressionalAction, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 51, 61 (1979).
245. Leon E. Irish & Harrison J. Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statu-
tory Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J.L. RFF. 109, 113 (1985).
246. 120 CONG. REc. 29,933 (1974) ("It is intended that such [ERISA] actions will be
regarded as arising under the laws of the United States, in similar fashion to those brought
under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.").
247. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987).
248. Id. (adopting LMRA Avco rule for benefits-due lawsuits). See supra note 98 for a
discussion of removal of benefits-due lawsuits.
249. Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 829 (7th
Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981); see supra note 171.
250. Incidentally, these cases were from federal district courts and not circuit courts.
251. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829; see supra note 150 and accompanying text.
252. Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council, 431 F. Supp. 745, 746-47 (E.D. Mich.
1972); see supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
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LMRA section 301 provides that litigants may enforce labor con-
tract matters in federal court253 or state court.254 The Supreme Court,
prior to ERISA's passage, held that the word "contract" in LMRA sec-
tion 301 encompasses more than just the collective bargaining agree-
ments.2"5 Further, in dicta the Court indicated that the term "contracts"
includes employee benefit plans mentioned in the collective bargaining
agreement.256 In fact, this reasoning provides the very jurisdictional ba-
sis under LMRA for federal courts to even consider disputes over multi-
employer employee benefit plans.25 7 Consequently, courts before and af-
ter ERISA have held that both employee benefit plans and trusts are
encompassed in contracts under LMRA section 301.258 In fact, the only
courts not to so hold are essentially those three district court opinions
seized by the court in Wardle to throttle the right to a jury trial.259
Those cases were decided in the late 1970s based on one 1960 district
court opinion applying trust law to a multi-employer pension plan.2e° In
1962, the Supreme Court pronounced that for section 301 purposes em-
253. See supra note 46.
254. See supra note 51.
255. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 26-28 (1962).
256. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157, 176-77 n.17 (1971).
257. Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1977).
258. Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 809 F.2d 1210, 1215 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (contracts
include pension trusts), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987); Whelan v. Colgan, 602 F.2d 1060,
1061 (2d Cir. 1979) (same); Rehmar, 555 F.2d at 1367 (plan enforceable under LMRA § 301);
Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 161 (9th Cir.) (contract consists of welfare trust plus collec-
tive bargaining agreement), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); International Union, United
Auto., Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Textron, Inc., 312 F.2d 688, 691 (6th
Cir. 1963) (rights of employee to pension benefit grow out of collective bargaining agreement);
Vallejo v. American R.R., 188 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1951) (treats employee benefit plan
under contract theory); American Fed'n of Labor v. Western Union Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 535,
538 (6th Cir. 1950) (contract includes trust since collective bargaining agreement refers to
trust); NYSA-ILA GAI Fund v. Poggi, 617 F. Supp. 847, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (contract
includes collective bargaining agreement plus pension plan); Stewart v. Trustees, Masters,
Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 432 F. Supp. 742, 748 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (describes plan as pen-
sion provisions of collective bargaining agreement), vacated on other grounds, 608 F.2d 776
(9th Cir. 1979); Smith v. DCA Food Indus., 269 F. Supp. 863, 868 (D. Md. 1967) (contract
includes provisions of pension fund established by collective bargaining agreement); New York
City Omnibus Corp. v. Quill, 73 N.Y.S.2d 289, 292 (Sup. Ct.) (treats employee benefit plan
under contract theory), aff'd, 74 N.Y.S.2d 925 (App. Div. 1947), modified, 78 N.E.2d 859,
860 (N.Y. 1948) (same).
259. See, ag., Davis v. Huge, 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2234 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 12, 1975); Genesta
v. San Diego County Laborers' Pension Plan, 87 Lab. Cas. (CCH) $ 11702, 22827 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 5, 1979); Porter v. Central States Pension Fund, 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3210 (N.D. Iowa
June 26, 1978).
260. Sichko v. Lewis, 191 F. Supp. 68 (W.D. Pa. 1960); see also Rice v. Hutton, 487 F.
Supp. 278, 279-80 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (no right to jury trial for review of pension denial since
arbitrary and capricious review standard is question of law).
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ployee benefit programs are contracts. 261 Reliance on an opinion im-
pliedly overruled by the nation's highest court can hardly serve as legal
precedent.262
Circuit court opinions since the Supreme Court's pronouncement
have considered employee benefit plans under LMRA section 301 as con-
tracts for purposes of determining the right to a jury trial.263 These
courts have required jury trials when requested for employees suing for
benefits due,264 for trustees suing for delinquent contributions265 and
261. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 26-28 (1962).
262. See supra note 155.
263. See infra notes 264-68 for courts allowing jury trials. See supra notes 259-60 for the
few courts denying jury trials.
264. E.g., Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 809 F.2d 1210, 1215 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (early
retirement benefits), cert denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987); Wise v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding
Co., 751 F. Supp. 90, 93 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (employee sued pension trustees to establish service
credits; sued employer, pension trustees and union to compel contributions on behalf, denied
jury trial under ERISA but granted jury trial as LMRA § 301 claim); Senn v. AMCA Int'l,
No. 87-C-1353, 1989 WL 248487, at *11 (E.D. Wis. May 9, 1989) (health and life insurance
benefits); Local 836 v. UAW, 670 F. Supp. 697, 707-08 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (retirees sued for
unpaid retirement benefits); Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587, 597-98 (E.D. Wash.
1986) (retirees sued for wrongful termination of benefits); Smith v. ABS Indus., 653 F. Supp.
94 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (retirees sued employers to establish right to medical and life insurance
benefits); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local 423 v. Texaco, 88 F.R.D. 86, 89 (E.D. Tex.
1980) (union for employees sued employer for reducing pension benefit); see Zuniga v. United
Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1987) (jury trial not questioned for employee suing for
sick leave benefits); Seafarers Pension Plan v. Sturgis, 630 F.2d 218, 219 (4th Cir. 1980) (jury
trial not questioned for employee suing for monthly benefit); see also Coleman v. Kroger Co.,
399 F. Supp. 724, 732 (W.D. Va. 1975) (used advisory jury for employee suing for disability
pension cast as breach of fair representation case against union). Contra Hechenberger v.
Western Elec. Co., 570 F. Supp. 820, 822 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (employees sued for workers com-
pensation reduced by plan benefits; no jury trial under LMRA on basis of ERISA law), aff'd,
742 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1212 (1985).
One commentator asserted that since (1) no court had provided a jury trial in a LMRA
benefits-due lawsuit as of 1981 and (2) several courts had tried such cases without jury trials,
see, eg., Knauss v. Gorman, 583 F.2d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1978) (pension benefit); Lugo v. Employ-
ees Retirement Fund of Illumination Prods. Indus., 529 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976) (same); Haynes v. Lewis, 298 F. Supp. 331, 332 (D.D.C. 1969);
Bolgar v. Lewis, 238 F. Supp. 595, 596 (W.D. Pa. 1960) (same), there probably was not a right
to a jury trial in such actions. See Comment, The Right to a Civil Jury Trial in ERISA Section
502(a)(1)(B) Actions: Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund,
65 MINN. L. REv. 1208, 1211 n.21 (1981). Presumedly, the argument would be that what the
law is, is best reflected in the practices of the lawyers as being their understanding of it. See
WILLIAM E. NELSON & JOHN P. REID, THE LITERATURE OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
268, 326 (1985) (describing John Reid's use of travel journals to glean law). However, the
more likely explanation is the litigant's waiver of his or her jury trial. All constitutional provi-
sions preserving the right to a jury trial in civil cases permit its waiver. E.g., ARK. CONST. art.
2, § 7 (specifically providing for waiver); Duognan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 198 (1927)
(under U.S. CONST. amend. VII). Some reasons for waiving jury trials are lower costs and
speedier trials. RICHARDSON R. LYNN, JURY TRIAL LAW AND PRACTICE 30-31 (1986).
Cases in which jury trials occurred reflect a more accurate picture of the law since one
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wrongfully paid benefits.266 These courts grant jury trials even in the
situations the court in Wardle abhorred-namely, when the jury must
make an arbitrary and capricious finding267 and when the court must
order future benefits.26 8 The only situation in which these courts deny a
jury trial under LMRA section 301 is when the litigants clearly seek only
equitable relief under the contract.269 Thus, the courts have preserved
the right to a jury trial for benefits-due lawsuits under LMRA section
301.
Courts should presume that when Congress passes new legislation to
solve a perceived problem, Congress considered prior case law relating to
the problem.270 In 1974, when Congress referred to LMRA section 301,
it was aware of the Supreme Court's 1962 pronouncement and the cases
following it announcing that employee benefit plans under LMRA sec-
tion 301 are contracts, and that such a pronouncement entails a right to
jury trial." 1 Congress could not have provided a clearer indication that
ERISA benefits-due lawsuits also entail a right to a jury trial.
B. Other Statutory and Constitutional Requirements
Constitutional and statutory considerations are unnecessary because
party definitely seeks to avoid the jury trial. However, this also is a defective indication of
what the law is since parties may consent to jury trials even when there is no right to a jury
trial. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c).
265. E.g., Sheet Metal Workers Local 19 v. Keystone Heating & Air Conditioning, 934
F.2d 35, 37 (3d Cir. 1991); Bugher v. Feightner, 722 F.2d 1356, 1358 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 822 (1984); Oregon Laborers-Employers Trust Funds v. Pacific Fence &
Wire, 726 F. Supp. 786, 788 (D. Or. 1989); see Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459,
462 (1960) (permitting jury trial without challenge); Lewis v. Lowry, 322 F.2d 453, 454 (4th
Cir. 1963) (same); Lewis v. Mears, 297 F.2d 101, 102 (3d Cir. 1961) (same), cerL denied, 369
U.S. 873 (1962); Lewis v. Kepple, 185 F. Supp. 884, 886 (W.D. Pa. 1960) (same), aff'd, 287
F.2d 409, 410 (3d Cir. 1961).
266. See Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Vrablick, 425 A.2d 1068,
1070 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (jury trial not questioned).
267. See Seafarers Pension Plan v. Sturgis, 630 F.2d 218, 219 (4th Cir. 1980).
268. See id.
269. E.g., United Steelworkers v. Connors Steel, 847 F.2d 707, 709 (1lth Cir. 1988) (trust-
ees sought injunction to prevent plan termination), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989); Souza v.
Trustees of the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust, 663 F.2d 942, 944-45 (9th Cir.
1981) (injunction to stop enforcement of age requirement for vesting); Nedd v. United Mine
Workers, 556 F.2d 190, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1977) (employees sued trustees for accounting), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Amcast Indus., 634 F.
Supp. 1135, 1144 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (injunction to prevent termination of early retirement sup-
plemental benefits); Nedd v. Thomas, 316 F. Supp. 74, 77 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (same), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Paddock v. L.W. Hembree Co., 763 P.2d 411, 413 (Or. Ct. App.
1988) (same).
270. See supra note 214.
271. See supra note 264.
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ERISA impliedly grants the right to a jury trial. Nevertheless, even
these considerations suggest that benefits-due lawsuits entail the right to
a jury trial.
These considerations are irrelevant in: (1) the six states already
treating benefits-due lawsuits as subject to the right to a jury trial because
they grant jury trials in both legal and equitable actions; 272 and (2) the
two states lacking both constitutional and statutory provisions preserving
the right to trial by jury in civil actions. 273 Louisiana's statutory provi-
sion will be invoked since its courts only deny jury trials for benefits-due
lawsuits due to federal law. 274 Therefore, these considerations are rele-
vant to the federal system and the remaining forty-two state systems, all
under their respective constitutional provisions.
The investigation of constitutional provisions under either the fed-
eral system or these state systems is the same, because all the relevant
state constitutional provisions operate similarly to the Seventh Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, 275 except for the time and place
reviewed.276 Analysis of the relevant constitutional provisions reveals
that the benefits-due lawsuit is an action and a sought remedy that is
legal in nature; therefore, these constitutional provisions preserve the
right to a jury trial for the benefits-due lawsuit.
1. The contractual nature of benefits-due lawsuits
The benefits-due lawsuit as an action is contractual, rather than
trust-like in nature. 277 The participant-beneficiary's rights arise solely
because of an exchange of services for the promised benefit from the em-
ployer. After the development of the first private employee benefit pro-
grams with exclusively employer contributions about 1875,278 jurists
have struggled with various theories of law to apply to the relationship,
such as the gratuity theory,27 9 the contractual theory, 280 the trust the-
272. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 176.
274. See supra note 190-93 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 116-21, 176-82 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
277. See infra notes 278-88 and accompanying text.
278. See WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCINE P. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 27 (1976) (describing first noncontributory private plan in North America as that of
American Express in 1875).
279. See, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1944); Hughes v. Encyclo-
paedia Britannica, 108 F. Supp. 303, 305 (N.D. Ill.), vacated on other grounds, 199 F.2d 295
(7th Cir. 1952); In re Schenectady Ry., 93 F. Supp. 67, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 1950) (for nonunion
employees); In re Missouri Pac. R.R., 49 F. Supp. 405, 406 (E.D. Mo. 1943); Fickling v.
Pollard, 179 S.E. 582, 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 1935); Hughes v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 117
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ory2 8 1 and the estoppel theory.282 However, only the contractual theory
gained such near universal acceptance that both the Supreme Court
283
N.E.2d 880, 882 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954); Umshler v. Umshler, 76 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Ill. App. Ct.
1947); Dolan v. Heller Bros., 104 A.2d 860, 861 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1954); Korb v.
Brooklyn Edison Co., 15 N.Y.S.2d 557, 557 (App. Div. 1939); Burgess v. First Nat'l Bank, 220
N.Y.S. 134, 139 (App. Div. 1927); Dolge v. Dolge, 75 N.Y.S. 386, 387 (App. Div. 1902);
McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98, 99 (App. Div. 1898), aff'd, 60 N.E. 1115 (N.Y.
1901); MacCabe v. Consolidated Edison Co., 30 N.Y.S.2d 445, 447 (City Ct. 1941).
The gratuity theory treated the employer's promise to pay benefits as a promise to make a
gift in the future. The promise was unenforceable until the gift was actually made, effectively
providing a block to the participant-beneficiary's recovery. The gratuity theory was popular
with courts since many plans had provisions stating that the employee acquired no enforceable
contractual rights under the plan. See, e.g., Menke, 140 F.2d at 790; Fickling, 179 S.E. at
583.
280. See, e.g., West v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 101 Cal. App. 2d 597, 603-05, 225 P.2d 978, 982-
83 (1951) (dicta); Bos v. United States Rubber Co., 100 Cal. App. 2d 565, 568, 224 P.2d 386,
388 (1950); Magee v. San Francisco Bar Pilots Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 88 Cal. App. 2d
278, 286-88, 198 P.2d 933, 938-39 (1948); Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 722, 197
P.2d 807, 813-15 (1948); Cowles v. Morris & Co., 161 N.E. 150, 154 (Ill. 1928); Askinas v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 111 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Mass. 1953); Psutka v. Michigan Alkali Co.,
264 N.W. 385, 386 (Mich. 1936); Gearns v. Commercial Cable Co., 32 N.Y.S.2d 856, 858 (Civ.
Ct. 1942), aff'd, 42 N.Y.S.2d 81 (App. Div. 1943), aff'd, 56 N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 1944); Wallace
v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 13 N.E.2d 139, 143 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937); Sigman v.
Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 11 N.E.2d 878, 879 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937); Wilson v. Rudolph Wur-
litzer Co., 194 N.E. 441, 443 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934); David v. Veitscher Magnesitwerke Actien
Gesellschaft, 35 A.2d 346, 349 (Pa. 1944); Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Jones, 103 S.W.2d 1043, 1045
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Schofield v. Zion's Co-op Mercantile Inst., 39 P.2d 342, 344 (Utah
1934); Gilbert v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 171 S.E. 814, 816 (W. Va. 1933); see also supra note 84.
Under the contractual theory, the employee's continued employment constituted consid-
eration for the employer's promise to pay the benefit. The drawback to the contractual theory
was that, until ERISA, the employer could place sufficient conditions in the plan to defeat
enforcement of the contract. The employee-beneficiary had no rights until he satisfied all con-
ditions, including age. See, eg., Wallace, 13 N.E.2d at 143; David, 35 A.2d at 349. The
contractual theory was by far the most popular with the courts. See, eg., Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989) (describing pre-ERISA law as contractual).
281. See, e.g., Exparte Garner, 190 So. 2d 544, 546 (Ala. 1966).
The trust theory treated the establishment of the plan as also establishing a trust for the
payment of the benefits to the employee-beneficiaries. Unfortunately, most employers never
actually paid monies to any trust prior to LMRA's requirements to do so for multi-employer
plans. The result was failure of the employees to recover benefits under a trust theory since
there was no trust res. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jackson & Squire, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 354, 359-60
(W.D. Ark. 1949), appeal dismissed, 181 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1950); Gearns v. Commercial
Cable Co., 42 N.Y.S.2d 81, 82 (App. Div. 1943), aff'd, 56 N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 1944). As a result,
most cases adopting this approach are LMRA cases. See supra note 85.
282. See, e.g., Sessions v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 47 Cal. App. 2d 611, 617, 118 P.2d
935, 939-40 (1941).
Estoppel theory held that the participant-beneficiary's right to the benefit arose because of
his reliance on the promise in continuing his work with that employer. Unfortunately, this
also seldom led to recovery of the benefit because the reliance must be reasonable. Employers
frequently made statements destroying that reasonable reliance. See, eg., Hughes v. Encyclo-
paedia Britannica, Inc., 117 N.E.2d 880, 882-83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954).
283. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 112; see also Puz v. Bessemer Cement, 700 F. Supp. 267, 268 (W.D.
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and Congress284 have recognized it.
From the employee's perspective the pension plan differs little from
the situation in which an annuity contract is purchased from an insur-
ance company. ERISA requires retirement plan benefits to be paid in the
form of a joint-and-survivor annuity, unless the participant and spouse
elect otherwise. 285 One of the possible elections is typically a lump-sum
distribution.286 Similarly, the welfare plan differs little from the situation
in which the participant-beneficiary purchases a medical policy or disa-
bility policy from an insurance company. The only real difference, from
the employee's viewpoint, is that for the employee benefit program (1)
the employee pays labor and not the monies the labor produced, (2) the
employee makes an exchange with the employer and not an insurance
company, and (3) the employee's risk is the employer's bankruptcy and
not the insurance company's bankruptcy. In fact, nothing in ERISA pre-
vents the employer in the employee benefit program situation from acting
solely as a middleman in an insurance policy situation. Frequently, em-
ployers fund employee benefit programs merely by purchasing annuity,
disability or group medical policies,287 rather than through a trust. Thus
Pa. 1988) (describing benefits-due lawsuit as contractual in nature); Jordan v. Reliable Life
Ins., 694 F. Supp. 822, 827 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (describing ERISA causes of action as tradition-
ally legal).
284. See supra note 229-30 and accompanying text.
285. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 1021(a), 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(l 1)
(1988); id. § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055.
286. See id. § 2005, 26 U.S.C. § 402(e)(4)(A) (taxation of lump-sum distribution from re-
tirement plan).
287. Fully insured retirement plans are exempt from the minimum funding requirements
for defined benefit and money purchase pension plans. Id. § 1011, 26 U.S.C. § 412(h)(2); id.
§ 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a); H.R. CONF. RP. No. 1280, supra note 19, at 323, reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5085 ("[A] plan may be invested wholly in insurance or annuity con-
tracts without violating the diversification rules .... "); see also Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v.
Hamilton Steel Prods., Inc., 448 F.2d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 1971) (employer funded pension plan
with group annuity policy). A fully insured plan is one that (1) is funded solely with individual
insurance or annuity contracts that call for level periodic premiums that are paid-up, (2) calls
for a benefit equal to that provided by the insurance contract, and (3) prohibits security inter-
ests in and loans against the insurance contracts. Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, § 1013, 26 U.S.C. § 412(i) (1988); id. § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1081(b); 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.412(i)-1(c) (1988). Reporting requirements are also simplified for fully-insured plans.
They merely report data supplied by the insurance company. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-5 (1991).
Other retirement plans may invest some of their assets in life and health insurance and
annuity contracts. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 19, at 314, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5094 ("[ERISA] does not prohibit a plan from purchasing life insurance,
health insurance, or annuities from the employer that maintains the plan .... "); RABKIN &
JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 13-1100 (provision in plan permitting investment in contracts
issued by sponsoring insurance company). These plans even provide for benefit payment in-
kind, namely with the insurance contract. See RABKIN & JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 13-1096
(provision in split-funded defined benefit prototype plan sold by insurance company permitting
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the benefits-due lawsuit, especially in the latter fully-funded situation, is
extremely similar to one for nonpayment on an insurance contract.
Courts handle lawsuits over insurance contracts generally as legal mat-
ters with the right to a jury trial.288
2. The remedy for a benefits-due lawsuit is damages
The remedy most frequently sought by the participant-beneficiary in
a benefits-due lawsuit is damages, a legal remedy that has a right to a
jury trial.289 The participant-beneficiary actually seeks either (1) full
payment, for lump-sum distributions from retirement plans or claims
from welfare plans;290 (2) the commencement or resumption of payment
for annuity distributions or disability payments in the future;291 or (3) a
transfer to participant as optional form of payment life insurance contracts on life and annuity
contracts); see also Van der Meulen v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 514 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974) (profit-sharing plan bought deferred annuity contract for terminated em-
ployee). Investment powers of the employee benefit plan's trust are generally regulated by
some state's trust act. Many of those statutes permit investment in insurance contracts. E.g.,
ALA. CODE § 19-3-125 (Michie 1990) (life, endowment or annuity contracts); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 2261(6) (Deering 1981) (same); IDAHO CODE § 68-406 (Michie 1990) (same); IND.
CODE ANN. § 30-1-5-1(2) (Burns 1990) (same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 682.23(13) (West 1989)
(same); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.020(1)(i) (Baldwin 1991) (same); see, e.g., Tax. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 113.056(b) (West 1991) ("acquire and retain every kind of property").
With respect to health and welfare plans, the employer normally pays for them on a pay-
as-you-go basis. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 26, at 70-71.
288. E.g., Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 101 P.2d 29, 29 (Colo. 1940) (payments
under disability provision of life insurance policy); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 42 S.W.2d
584, 587 (Mo. 1931) (death benefit under life insurance policy); Wollums v. Mutual Beneficial
Health & Accident Ass'n, 46 S.W.2d 259, 262-63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931) (payments under disa-
bility insurance policy); Davis v. Prudential Ins. Co., 297 N.Y.S.2d 261, 262 (App. Div. 1969)
(action to enforce "an annuity contract is an action for a money judgment triable by jury as of
right"); Schenck v. Prudential Ins. Co., 3 N.Y.S.2d 856, 858 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (same; life insur-
ance policy); Monetta v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 115 N.E.2d 845, 846 (Ohio Ct. App.
1952) (death benefit under life insurance policy); see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 330 F.2d 250, 258 (9th Cir. 1964) (automobile liability insurance policy);
Dixie Auto Ins. Co. v. Goudy, 382 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Ark. 1964) (same); Fratis v. Fireman's
Fund Am. Ins. Co., 56 Cal. App. 3d 339, 341-42, 128 Cal. Rptr. 391, 393 (1976) (same);
Clayton v. Alliance Mut. Casualty Co., 512 P.2d 507, 517 (Kan.) (same); Jones v. City of
Kenner, 338 So. 2d 606, 607 (La. 1976) (liability insurance policy); Nassif Realty Corp. v.
National Fire Ins. Co., 220 A.2d 748, 750 (N.H. 1966) (fire insurance policy); Oltarsh v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 204 N.E.2d 622, 626 (N.Y. 1965) (public liability insurance policy); American Em-
ployers' Ins. Co. v. McGehee, 485 P.2d 754, 756 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (automobile liability
insurance policy).
289. Equity courts could not grant damages. BAKER, supra note 88, at 272-73. Hence,
litigants sought damages at law, with a jury trial. Id. at 285-86.
290. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 402, 26 U.S.C. § 402(e)(4)(A) (1988) (pro-
viding for taxation of lump sum distributions from pension plans).
291. See, eg., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 205, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1055(d) (1988) (requiring pension benefits in form of qualified joint and survivor annuity
unless waived).
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declaration of the right to such payments. 292 Seeking lump-sum pay-
ments clearly would be a legal action.293 Commencement of payments
resembles specific performance, typically an equity action,294 however,
sometimes insurance law treats such actions as legal with the right to a
jury trial.295 The right to a jury trial in a declaratory judgment action
depends on the underlying action, whether if brought it would seek a
legal or equitable remedy.296
Under the insurance law analogy, there are nonetheless two legal
hurdles to overcome in order to characterize the remedy as legal. First,
the insured under an annuity or disability policy sometimes cannot sue
for the entire benefit, either as a lump sum or as payments in the future.
According to the courts, failure to pay some installment payments cur-
rently due, for which the insured can sue, 297 does not bear on the future
292. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1987). Upon breach of
an insurance contract, the insured normally has an election of remedies among (1) rescission of
the contract and a suit in quasi-contract for the value rendered, namely the premiums less the
cost of coverage, (2) waiting until the time of performance and suing for the entire amount
due, (3) suing for damages under anticipatory breach, and (4) specific performance. See, e.g.,
Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. v. Weck, 9 Ill. App. 358, 361 (1881) (life insurance); Marshall v. Frank-
lin Fire Ins. Co., 35 A. 204, 205 (Pa. 1896) (same); Kerns v. Prudential Ins. Co., 11 Pa. Super.
209, 212 (1899) (same).
293. A court would try even an action under trust law, normally tried in equity without a
right to a jury trial, as a legal action with a jury trial. Trust law recognizes actions for lump-
sum benefits as amounts unconditionally and immediately due and thus legal actions. E.g.,
Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. DiGregorio, 811 F.2d 1249, 1251-52 n.2 (9th Cir.
1987); Jefferson Nat'l Bank v. Central Nat'l Bank, 700 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1983); Ovitz
v. Jefferies & Co., 553 F. Supp. 300, 301 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see supra note 105. Courts should
also reject as ridiculous the idea common in the First Circuit that a plan administrator's erro-
neous interpretation of the plan contract thwarts the unconditional requirement of trust law.
See supra note 164.
Under insurance law, insureds can recover unpaid amounts due under the policy as legal
actions. See, e.g., Hines v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 6 F. Supp. 692, 692 (E.D.N.Y. 1934) (at
law); Menssen v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 114, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1933) (same; future dam-
ages unavailable as too difficult for jury); Wyll v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 483,
484 (N.D. Tex. 1933) (at law); Cobb v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 4 Cal. 2d 565, 571-72, 51
P.2d 84, 87 (1935) (advisory jury); Brix v. Peoples Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 Cal. 2d 446,452-53, 41
P.2d 537, 540 (1935) (jury trial).
294. See BAKER, supra note 88, at 273, 279 (discussing performance covenants).
295. See infra notes 304-09 and accompanying text.
296. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963).
297. E.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672, 678 (1936) (disability policy);
Mobley v. New York Life Ins. Co., 295 U.S. 632, 638 (1935) (same); Hines, 6 F. Supp. at 693
(same); Menssen, 5 F. Supp. at 116 (same); Wyll, 3 F. Supp. at 484 (same); Kithcart v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 1 F. Supp. 719, 720 (W.D. Mo. 1932) (same); Cobb, 4 Cal. 2d at 571-72,
51 P.2d at 87 (same); Brix, 2 Cal. 2d at 455, 41 P.2d at 542 (same); Scott v. Life & Casualty
Ins. Co., 129 S.E. 903, 904 (Ga. Ct. App. 1925) (health policy); Howard v. Benefit Ass'n of Ry.
Employees, 39 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Ky. 1931) (disability policy); Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Serio,
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performance.2 98 This problem does not affect all remedies sought by po-
tential participant-beneficiaries, but only those paid in a form similar to
annuities. Courts generally state the rule as follows: the doctrine of an-
ticipatory breach, permitting the nonbreacher to treat current breaches
as a total breach and sue also for total future damages, does not apply to
unilateral contracts.2 99 Almost all insurance contracts are unilateral in
that either the premiums have been paid, or the premium payment is a
condition to the insurance company's obligation to pay.3co The above
formulation is overbroad. This becomes evident when examining the life
insurance policy cases, which recognize anticipatory breach for a breach
before the insured's death and permit the insured to sue for future bene-
fits presently.30' Justice Benjamin Cardozo enunciated the correct rule:
anticipatory breach lies for unilateral contracts unless the performer acts
in good faith in not complying with its terms.30 2
157 So. 474, 474 (Miss. 1935) (same); Allen v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 67 S.W.2d
534-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934) (same).
298. Viglas, 297 U.S. at 678.
299. E.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 254 F.2d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 1958)
(period-certain annuity contract); Greguhn v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 461 P.2d 285, 287
(Utah 1969) (disability annuity); 1 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 318 (1932).
300. See 4 CORBIN, supra note 81, § 968, at 880.
301. E.g., Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 Cal. 2d 94, 104, 142 P.2d 741, 746
(1943) (future damages for disability contract breached before disabled); Federal Life Ins. Co.
v. Maxam, 117 N.E. 801, 804-06 (Ind. Ct. App. 1917) (cost of replacement for life insurance
policy); O'Neill v. Supreme Council Am. Legion of Honor, 57 A. 463, 465-66 (N.J. 1904)
(suggests future damages for life insurance policy); Speer v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 36
Hun. 322, 325 (N.Y. 1885) (present value of replacement less present value of unpaid premi-
ums for life insurance policy); Garland v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 101 S.E. 616, 619
(N.C. 1919) (policy amount less future premiums for life insurance policy); American Ins.
Union v. Woodward, 247 P. 398, 399-401 (Okla. 1926) (face value less unpaid premiums for
life insurance policy); Marshall v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 35 A. 204, 205 (Pa. 1896) (replace-
ment cost for life insurance policy); Kerns v. Prudential Ins. Co., 11 Pa. Super. 209, 212 (1899)
(same); Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Neeley, 135 S.W. 1046, 1048-49 (Trex. Civ. App.
1911) (face value less unpaid premiums discounted for life insurance policy); Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Ass'n v. Taylor, 37 S.E. 854, 855 (Va. 1901) (suggests future value for life insurance
policy); Clemmitt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 76 Va. 355, 363 (1882) (present value less present
value of unpaid premiums for life insurance policy); Merrick v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 102 N.W. 593, 595 (Wis. 1905) (uses New York rule for life insurance policy).
The only jurisdictions denying this rule are New York, overruling its earlier decisions
recognizing the rule, e.g., Kelly v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 N.E. 584, 585 (N.Y. 1906)
(since specific performance is available); Langan v. Supreme Council Am. Legion of Honor, 66
N.E. 932, 933 (N.Y. 1903) (same), and Massachusetts, which has never recognized anticipa-
tory breach, e.g., Porter v. American Legion of Honor, 67 N.E. 238, 239 (Mass. 1903) (life
insurance); Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, 532 (1874) (land transaction).
302. Viglas, 297 U.S. at 676, 678-81 (good faith; possible for anticipatory repudiation to
occur).
Confusion over the correct rule probably arose due to the resistance to the anticipatory
repudiation doctrine by the influential Samuel Williston, chief reporter of the First Restate-
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With this rule for anticipatory breach, no problem as to the remedy
sought should arise in the ERISA benefits-due lawsuit since the litigant
must show abuse of discretion, namely, that the surrogate insurance
company acted in bad faith.3 3  Under insurance law, that showing
would entitle the participant-beneficiary to sue presently for a lump sum
payment representing all future payments because of anticipated breach,
clearly a legal remedy with a right to a jury trial.
The second problem with characterizing benefits-due lawsuits as
legal is that some courts have suggested that, for litigants not seeking a
ment of Contracts. See Samuel Williston, Repudiation of Contracts (pts I & 2), 14 HARv. L.
REv. 317, 421 (1901); see also GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 59-60 (1974)
(noting that confusion arose because Williston and Corbin, his chief assistant in drafting First
Restatement of Contracts, held antithetical points of view); Eric M. Holmes, Anticipatory Re-
pudiation and Insurance Installment Payment Obligations: Anachronistic Application of a Uni-
form Formula, 40 INS. COUNSEL J. 396, 397-98 (1973) (noting that doctrine of anticipatory
repudiation was hostilely received when first enunciated). Williston's position that anticipa-
tory repudiation does not apply to unilateral contracts, I RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 318 (1932), is clearly wrong since it fails to explain the life insurance cases. See supra note
301. Other authors' distinctions between calculable damages for life insurance policies and
incalculable damages for disability contracts, 4 CORBIN, supra note 81, § 968, at 880; see
Mabery v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 250 P.2d 824, 828-30 (Kan. 1952) (future damages
under disability annuity too speculative), and between unconditioned life insurance policies
and conditioned disability contracts, JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS
§ 12-9 (1987), explain the life insurance cases but fail to explain a major portion of the disabil-
ity contract cases.
The disability contract cases follow Cardozo's rule. They refuse to apply anticipatory
breach to situations in which the insurance company failed to perform due to good faith com-
pliance with its understanding of the annuity contract. E.g., United Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v.
Dempsey, 122 S.W.2d 170, 171 (Ark. 1938) (good faith, no anticipatory breach); Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Holder, 105 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Ark. 1937) (relied on terms, no anticipatory breach);
Industrial Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Buggs, 200 S.E. 537, 539-40 (Ga. Ct. App. 1938) (same);
Moore v. Prudential Ins. Co., 192 S.E. 731, 734-36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1937) (same); Kentucky
Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 270 S.W.2d 188, 194-95 (Tenn. 1954) (same). In the
presence of that bad faith, courts find anticipatory breach. E.g., Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty
Co. v. Klotz, 251 F.2d 499, 504-05 (5th Cir. 1958) (disability, finding anticipatory breach);
Williams v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 100 F.2d 264, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1938)
(same); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Pool, 143 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Ark. 1940) (same); Home
Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 75 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Ark. 1934) (same); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Gregory, 67 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Ark. 1934) (same); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 60 S.W.2d 912,
915 (Ark. 1933) (same); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Phifer, 254 S.W. 335, 337 (Ark. 1923) (same);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lancaster, 180 S.E. 641, 643 (Ga. Ct. App. 1935) (same); Indiana Life
Endowment Co. v. Reed, 103 N.E. 77, 80-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 1913) (same); Universal Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 102 S.W.2d 405, 406-07 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1937) (same); Con-
tinental Casualty Co. v. Vaughn, 407 S.W.2d 818, 820-23 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (same); Conti-
nental Casualty Co. v. Boerger, 389 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (same); Southland
Life Ins. Co. v. Gatewood, 115 S.W.2d 723, 727-28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), aff'd, 141 S.W.2d
588 (Tex. 1940); Needham v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 97 S.W.2d 1016, 1020-21 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936).
303. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
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lump sum presently but a compulsion of payments as they come due, the
court would have to order future benefits. 3" Thus, the remedy is specific
performance and hence equitable. However, courts are presently work-
ing toward a solution in insurance contract law.305 This solution in-
volves money judgments payable in installments.306 Installment
judgments are common practice in civil law jurisdictions. 30 7 Early in the
twentieth century several American courts concluded that courts could
not issue installment money judgments for disability annuities.30 8 More
recently, however, several American courts have permitted such judg-
ments. 3 9 Thus, a lawsuit for benefits payable in the future can also be a
legal action seeking a money judgment.
Under the court's authority in ERISA actions to fashion a federal
common law of ERISA,31° the court may use this state law as its
model.311
V. CONCLUSION
Some district courts have suggested that, when the United States
Supreme Court faces the issue, it will decide in favor of the right to a jury
trial for benefits-due lawsuits. 312 This is especially so in light of the con-
304. ERg., Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1526 (1lth Cir. 1990)
(ordering of continuing benefits from group health plan is equitable).
305. See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
306. See infra notes 308-09 and accompanying text.
307. German courts may require tortfeasors to pay damages representing decreased earning
ability for tortious personal injuries in installments. Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) art. 843
(F.R.G.), translated in THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE, AS AMENDED TO JANUARY 1, 1975 (Ian S.
Forrester et al. trans., 1975). German courts similarly enforce contracts for annuities through
money judgments payable in installment payments three months in advance. Id. art. 760.
308. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Simmons, 79 S.W.2d 419, 424 (Ark. 1935)
(overruling one as judgment would not be certain); Brix v. Peoples Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 Cal.
2d 446, 452-53, 41 P.2d 537, 539-40 (1935) (overruling one as not authorized in declaratory
judgment statute); Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 167 S.E. 38, 42 (N.C. 1932) (same);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. English, 72 S.W. 58, 59 (Tex. 1903) (overruling one as it has never
been done before).
309. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 254 F.2d 417, 427 (9th Cir. 1958) (apply-
ing New Mexico law); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 354 S.W.2d 519, 521 (Ky. 1961);
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Goble, 72 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Ky. 1934); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Hampton, 65 S.W.2d 980, 983 (Ky. 1933); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Branham, 63
S.W.2d 498, 500 (Ky. 1933); Melancon v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 147 So. 346, 348
(La. 1933); Caporali v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 307 N.W.2d 218, 225 (Wis. 1981).
310. See supra note 171.
311. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (under
LMRA courts are to create uniform federal common law, in which state law is source of
potentially compatible rules). Cardozo's opinion, see supra note 302, should be a strong indi-
cation of what that federal common law ought to be. Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 457.
312. Jordan v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 694 F. Supp. 822, 827 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
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gressional legislative history indicating that Congress views the benefits-
due lawsuit as contractual, realizes that both state and federal courts
treated them as contractual under pre-ERISA law, even LMRA, and ex-
pressly intended to increase the legal remedies under benefits-due law-
suits. Contractual legal remedies require the right to a jury trial. But
even in the absence of this legislative history, constitutional provisions
preserving the right to a civil jury trial mandate the jury trial because the
participant-beneficiary's rights in the benefits-due lawsuit arise under a
contractual theory and the participant-beneficiary generally seeks a legal
remedy. Moreover, the only case advanced against the right to a jury
trial for the benefits-due lawsuit involves erroneous, if not dishonorable,
obfuscations and cannot properly serve as legal precedent.
Until the correct decision comes down, some district courts refuse to
strike the jury demand until the last possible moment in hopes that their
circuit court will finally revive its legal sensibilities.313 The federal circuit
courts should desire to correct the legal error of denying jury trials for
benefits-due lawsuits. Jury trials permit judges to escape the onus for
clearly unjust results.314 Judges then could avoid appearing as despots
permitting an employer, through its hand-picked plan administrator, vin-
dictively to deny a participant-beneficiary a lump-sum benefit because the
former employee also took the employer's substantial clients to his new
employer,315 or reduce the benefit because the former employee partici-
pated in a strike against the employer.3" 6 Such an unjust result would be
the jury's onus 317 or, more likely, the jury would sense the injustice and
decide differently to correct that injustice.318 And that was what Con-
gress sought in passing ERISA: participant-beneficiaries ought to re-
cover benefits they rightfully are owed.
313. See Brokke v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 703 F. Supp. 215, 221-22 (D. Conn. 1988) (noting
that area of law concerning right to jury trial in ERISA action is fluid).
314. GUNrrHER, supra note 92, at 40, 44 (judges have tendency to rigidly follow rule of
law without regard to doing substantial justice).
315. Most circuit court opinions appear as cases without real malice between the employer
and the former employee; however, occasionally there appears a fact pattern that experienced
ERISA lawyers immediately recognize as a plan administrator decision resulting from the
improper motives that the abuse of discretion standard should have overturned. But the
judges blindly apply their version of that rule to enforce the miscarriage of justice. See Denton
v. First Nat'l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir. 1985) (bank); Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d
1139, 1141 (2d Cir. 1984) (financial printer).
316. See Edwards v. Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. Pension Trust, 757 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir.
1985).
317. See GUiNTHER, supra note 92, at 44 (jury serves as lightning rod to insulate judges
from public outcry).
318. Id. at 40 (jury considers matters other than technical legal rules).
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